Class 




Book 



Copyright N . 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



Beino 



A STUDY IN METAPHYSICS 



BY 



REV. ALOYSIUS ROTHER, S.J. 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY 



ST. LOUIS, MO., ion 

Published by B. Herder 

17 South Broadway 

FREIBURG (BADEN) I LONDON, W. C. 

Germany I 68, Great Russell Street 



^ 



IMPRIMI POTEST 

R. J. Meyer, S. J. 

Praep . Prov . Miss 
Sti. Ludovici, die 7. Sept. 1911 



NIHIL OBSTAT 
Sti. Ludovici, die 17. Sept. 1911 

F. G. Holweck, 

Censor Librorum 



IMPRIMATUR 
Sti. Ludovici, die 18. Sept. 1911 

©Joannes J. Glennon, 

Archiepiscopus Sti. Ludovici, 



Copyright 1911, by Joseph Gummersbach 



Becktold Printing and Book Mfg. Co., St. Louis, Mo. 



©CI.A297887 



CONTENTS 



^ 



PAGE 

Introduction vii 

CHAPTER 

I The Term Being i 

II Unity and Commonness of Being ... 13 

III Unity of Being Not Real 24 

IV Inclusion of the Modes in Being ... 49 
V Being Not a Genus 54 

VI Composition of Being With Its Modes 
article 1 
Composition of Being With Its Modes 

Not Metaphysical 60 

article 2 
Composition of Being With Its Modes 

Logical j6 

VII Unity of Being Imperfect 84 

VIII Analogousness of Being 
article i 
Notion of Analogy 90 

ARTICLE 2 

Intrinsic Metaphysical Analogy of Be- 
ing 107 

article 3 

Analogy of Being Analogy of Attribu- 
tion in 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/beingstudyinmetaOOroth 



PREFACE 

The treatise on Being herein sub- 
mitted is an attempt to simplify 
a subject very important to the 
student of philosophy. In making 
the attempt, the author has pur- 
sued the method adopted by him in 
his treatise on Certitude. 



INTRODUCTION 

The solidity of a building depends mainly on 
the stability of its foundation. When this is 
poorly laid, the building is unsafe ; when this be- 
comes undermined, the edifice is sure to topple 
to the ground and bury its inmates under its 
ruins. Now, what the foundation is to a 
building, that metaphysics is to philosophy. Its 
notions and principles form the groundwork of 
all knowledge. One single error in matters 
metaphysical is often enough to bring about the 
total downfall of all true science and leave doubt 
and falsehood in its place. And not only does 
the fate of the natural sciences hinge upon cor- 
rect metaphysical tenets : supernatural religion 
itself is dependent upon them ; for faith must be 
reasonable ; and how can it be so when first prin- 
ciples are perverted and denied ? 

We need but cast a glance at the History of 
Philosophy to fmcl ample proof for our con- 
tention. All the false philosophy of modern 
times, which has wrought such frightful havoc 
in the realm of truth, starts with erroneous 
views upon metaphysical questions. Thus, to 
give just a few instances, Hegel bases his mon- 
vii 



viii Introduction 

strous doctrine of philosophy on a wrong con- 
ception of "indeterminate being" (ens ut sic). 
Spinoza builds his wild speculations on an ar- 
bitrary definition of " substance." Kant endeav- 
ors to show that the existence of God cannot be 
certainly known " by the things that are made," 
for the reason that with him both the " concept 
of cause " and the " principle of causality " are 
purely subjective, and hence not applicable to 
things in themselves. Locke, by making per- 
sonality consist in " actual self-consciousness," 
renders two of the most fundamental mysteries 
of our faith self-contradictory, namely, the 
Trinity of persons in the Godhead, and the unity 
of person in Christ. Descartes, as far as lay in 
him, dealt the deathblow to metaphysics by his 
teaching on the origin of " possible being" : and 
this same Descartes is the father of the modern 
philosophical movement from Spinoza to Hegel. 

From this we can see how important it is, to 
lay the foundation of philosophy broad and deep 
by expounding and safeguarding metaphysical 
notions and principles, however subtle and ab- 
struse they may be. 

Considerations such as these have encouraged 
us to undertake a systematic development of the 
concept of " BEING," the most metaphysical of 
all metaphysical concepts : with what success, the 
following pages will show. 



BEING 

CHAPTER FIRST 
The Term Being 

Summary: The province of metaphysics — The no- 
tion of being — Being and " ens " compared 
— Being employed as a participle and as 
a participial adjective — "Ens" as a noun 
and as a participle — Chimerical being — 
Wholly indefinite being described — Syn- 
onyms of being — The opposite of being 
or "nothing." 

i. The Province of Metaphysics. The 

science of metaphysics opens with the consider- 
ation of the idea of being. For metaphysics in- 
vestigates those notions which possess the most 
far-reaching universality. Some of these notions 
are literally common to all things : as, being, 
unity, truth, goodness; whilst the others occur 
in pairs of opposites or correlatives, which divide 
all things between themselves in such wise that 
either the one or the other of the two associated 
notions is predicable of any object whatsoever: 
as, cause and effect, substance and accident, 
I 



2 Being 

potency and existence. Hence these latter con- 
cepts might be called disjunctively common to all 
things. St. Thomas says that the subject-mat- 
ter of metaphysics is " ens et ea quae ipsum con- 
sequuntur," that is, " being and those things 
which are consequent upon being." 

Metaphysics, then, examines the broadest, and 
therefore the most fundamental, of notions. The 
reign of these notions is felt throughout the vast 
realm of existence and possibility. He who lays 
sacrilegious hands on any one of them by call- 
ing its objective validity into question, thereby 
brings the edifice of knowledge crashing about his 
head ; nay more, such a one would reduce all be- 
ing to absolute nothingness, did its existence de- 
pend on his denial. Father Balmes expresses 
this fundamental necessity in his own striking 
and graceful way : " Ontology," he says, " circu- 
lates like life-giving fluid through all the other 
sciences" (Fund. Phil. v. 2, n. 288). Hence 
it is that metaphysics has been called the queen 
of sciences. These considerations prove the folly 
of those who belittle and discountenance the 
study of metaphysics. They tell us, metaphysics 
is intangible, obscure, and prosaic. It is not in- 
tangible, but it is abstruse; and how could it be 
otherwise considering that it deals with the most 
extensive and most universal of notions. It is 
not obscure, but profound ; for it descends to the 
lowest depths of reality and thought, to the last 



The Term Being 3 

causes, which lie buried away down as the foun- 
dations and basis of all things. Metaphysics, 
finally, is not prosaic ; but it is sublime. True, it 
does not lay claim to that attractiveness and fas- 
cination which truths, clothed with all the witch- 
ery of fancy, possess: for the concrete only can 
present itself to man with all that fulness of per- 
fection which appeals to the sense of the beauti- 
ful : but metaphysics is vast, it is comprehensive, 
it eludes whatever the fancy in its wildest flights 
can conjure up ; and these are some of the char- 
acteristics of the sublime. 

2. The notion of being. The foregoing 
considerations indicate that being is the most 
metaphysical of all metaphysical notions ; for it 
is a term which may be applied to whatever has 
reality; and this is the reason, too, why the 
science of metaphysics begins with the analysis 
of being. 

3. Being and ens compared. But here we 
are forced into an awkward situation. We are 
concerned here with the meaning of the English 
word " being/' and not with the Greek term 
ov, or the Latin " ens." Now, we are apt to 
ascribe to being all that the old philosophers say 
of ov and of " ens." Are we justified in doing 
so? Is being the exact equivalent of the Latin 
" ens," which is the literal rendering of the Greek 
ov r 

But perhaps some one might ask, why refer 



4 Being 

to the meaning of the Latin " ens " at all ? We 
are not discussing this subject in Latin, but in 
English. 

There are several reasons why we should take 
particular notice of the Latin term " ens " in this 
connection. For, in the first place, the subject of 
being has been, and still is sifted most thoroughly 
in Latin works, which expound the teaching of 
the schoolmen; and hence a comparison of the 
Latin " ens " and the English " being," cannot but 
be very useful to all familiar with the original 
Latin sources. Moreover, very much of the phil- 
osophic thought stored up in English treatises has 
been garnered from the Scholastics. Lastly, the 
word " ens " has been incorporated into the Eng- 
lish language, as any of our larger dictionaries 
will attest. Thus, one of them, the Century 
Dictionary, gives the following quotation under 
"ens"; 

" To thee, Creator uncreate, 
O ens entium, divinely great." 1 

1 It sometimes happens that scholarly students who 
are fond of the language of Virgil, Horace, and Cicero 
are shocked at meeting such a solecism or Latin mon- 
strosity as the present participle of the verb " esse," 
and feel inclined perhaps to look with contempt upon 
the Schoolmen for using this and similar incorrect and 
uncouth expressions. We should not judge the scho- 
lastic philosophers too harshly for this apparent as- 
sault upon the purity of the Latin. For it must be 
admitted that this tongue is not rich in convenient 
philosophic terms and phrases, and that it lacks suitable 
expressions for some of the most ordinary and funda- 
mental ideas of speculative thought. Thus, such words 



The Term Being 5 

Let us now return to the question just mooted, 
Are the Latin word " ens " and the English term 
" being " synonymous ? 

To settle this point, let us first determine the 
meaning of " being," and then compare it with 
the various acceptations of " ens." 

4. Being employed as a participle and as 
a participial adjective. Being, as here under- 
stood, although it has the ending of a participle, 
is, in reality, a verbal noun with a twofold mean- 
as " essentia," " existentia," " possibilitas," " individ- 
uation " personalitas," " causalitas," " certitudo," " mo- 
tivum," and many others will be looked for in vain in 
classical writers. The Romans were a war-like na- 
tion, a practical people: they did not care much for 
subtle theorizing. This would explain the comparative 
barrenness of their language in terms and phrases for 
conveying abstract philosophic notions. The Greeks, 
on the contrary, were the very antipodes of the 
Romans in their relation to philosophy; for, their 
tongue teems with a wonderful wealth of clear-cut, 
metaphysical words and expressions, and justly glories 
in a surpassing suppleness and pliability for com- 
municating the nicest shades of meaning. What then 
were the Scholastic philosophers to do? The Latin 
was the established medium of thought of those earnest 
and deep thinkers. It was not feasible to substitute 
the Greek tongue in place of the Latin ; they did not 
think it wise to transplant Greek idioms unchanged 
into another language. Hence they felt themselves 
compelled to coin certain words and phrases, as we 
ourselves are doing constantly. As regards the fre- 
quent occurrence of the present participle of " esse," 
" ens," which may seem to some a barbarism for which 
no apology can be offered, something can be said in 
defence and palliation of Scholastic usage. For, as 
Andrew's Latin Dictionary tells us, "the part. pres. 
ens is used by Caesar according to Prise, p. 1140 P. 
and by Sergius Flavius according to Quint. 8. 3. 33." 



6 Being 

ing, namely that of a participle and that of a 
participial adjective. For the sake of greater 
clearness, let us first state the difference between 
a participle and a participial adjective in general, 
and then apply it to our case. 

The participial adjective denotes capacity, fit- 
ness, ability, readiness for the performance of 
an action ; whilst the participle as such expresses 
the actualization or exercise of that capacity, 
fitness, ability and readiness. 

Thus, when I say, " the physician is observ- 
ing " or " the gladiator is daring" I mean that 
the former possesses the power of observation to 
a marked degree, and the latter is ready or pre- 
pared to face danger. But when I declare that 
the physician is observing the symptoms of his 
patient or the gladiator daring the lion, I want 
to denote the actualization of that power or 
readiness, in a word, the actual performance of 
an action. 

Now let us transfer this to being. Mind, we 
do not say that being is a participle or a par- 
ticipial adjective; but that it may have the force 
of either. For it sometimes denotes merely 
reality, capacity for existence, that which can 
exist, regardless of the fact of its actual exist- 
ence or non-existence. In this case, being has 
the force of a participial adjective; for exam- 
ple, when I say, God is infinite being. It is 
used in this way especially where it performs 



The Term Being 7 

the office of objective case to the verb " to have," 
as in the following propositions, " A blade of 
grass has being," " A dew-drop has being." 

But being very frequently signifies the actu- 
alization of the capacity for existence. It is 
plain that in this instance, it has the force of 
the participle " existing " ; for that which actu- 
alizes the capacity for existence, is, of course, 
existence itself. A case in point would be the 
sentence, " The Guardian Angels are loving, de- 
voted beings," i. e. loving, devoted, existing reali- 
ties. 

5. Ens as a noun and as a participle. The 
Latin word " ens " is likewise used in two ways, 
namely as a noun and as a participle. When 
employed as a participle, it is equivalent in mean- 
ing to " existing," and hence corresponds to the 
English being in one of the acceptations just 
given. As a noun, ens has the same significa- 
tion as the English participial adjective ; for in 
Latin, participles are often used as nouns to ex- 
press capacity for something, as when I say, 
" Omne vivens est substantia." 

Let us now note in what being and ens differ. 
In the first place, being is in common use in our 
everyday language, whereas ens is a purely phil- 
osophical term of middle age Latin. 

As regards the meaning of the two, it would 
seem that in English, being, in its ordinary ac- 
ceptation, denotes the same as that which exists. 



8 Being 

This also is the prevailing signification of the 
word " ens " in Latin. Thus, St. Thomas tells us 
that the word " ens " is chiefly used to desig- 
nate the existent, whilst the term " res " is re- 
served for expressing essence in its most abstract 
form or the mere capability for existence. 

However, as hinted before, " ens " may also 
be used as a noun, and " being " in the sense 
of a participial adjective, provided it appears 
from the context or in some other way that such 
use is intended. 

" Being " is also frequently taken as the pres- 
ent participle of the auxiliary verb " to be," as 
in the sentence, " The enterprise is being carried 
out " ; and very often, it is employed in place 
of the copula " is " in participial constructions ; 
e. g. "This being so . ."Of course, 

" ens " is never used in this manner. 

The above comparison shows that, excepting 
the last two acceptations of " being," " ens " and 
" being " are substantially equivalents. 

Let us now analyze a little more accurately the 
nature of being as having the force of a parti- 
cipial adjective. For it is with being in this 
sense only, that we are at present concerned. 

6. Chimerical being. But before entering 
upon our analysis of being thus taken, we must 
first somewhat restrict its meaning. For being 
can exist in a twofold state, namely, in the real 
and in the logical state. At present, our busi- 



The Term Being 9 

tiess is with " real being," that is being which 
can exist apart from the mind, and not with 
" logical being " or being whose existence is 
confined to the region of mere thought. Being 
of this latter sort is called " ens rationis," a 
mere creature or figment of the mind, which is 
never to be found outside of cognition. Thus, 
should I conceive a triangular square as some- 
thing, or attribute being to a number of animals 
sitting in council and making speeches, or to 
rocks and stocks listening in rapture to Orpheus' 
lute — it is plain that in all these cases the " be- 
ing " signified can have existence nowhere ex- 
cept in the mind : being of this sort is a mere 
mental product or figment, and might not unfit- 
tingly be called " chimerical " being. For, ac- 
cording to Webster, " chimerical " in one of its 
meanings denotes the same as " having or capa- 
ble of having no existence except in thought." 

7. Wholly indefinite being described. Our 
concern here, then, is not with this kind of be- 
ing, but with real being, and that in its most 
general acceptation, that is, as shorn of all de- 
terminations and" specifications whatsoever. 
Hence, we abstract even from the circumstance, 
as to whether it is actual or merely possible. 
Being as here taken, is the most indeterminate 
concept conceivable; it is a concept in which 
abstraction has been pushed to its ultimate limit, 
a concept stript of whatever discriminates or 



io Being 

differentiates one thing from another; it is the 
vanishing point of all distinction and diversity; 
it is being conceived in its greatest vagueness. 
It might not improperly be styled in English 
" wholly indefinite being " ; and this is what the 
Schoolmen call " ens ut sic," " being as such." 

8. Synonyms of being. There are a num- 
ber of synonyms of the term being, as thing, 
something, reality, entity, object. To determine 
their very nice shades of difference, belongs to 
the grammarian and lexicographer rather than 
to the philosopher. We would only call atten- 
tion to the term " object," which regards being 
as presented to the mind. For "object" from 
the Latin " objicere," literally signifies that 
which is thrown or lies before (viz. the mind). 
Webster defines " object " as " that which is set 
or may be regarded as set before the mind, so as 
to be apprehended or known." The other syno- 
nyms of being view being rather as it is in it- 
self. 

9. The opposite of being or " nothing." 
Thus far we have spoken of the meaning of be- 
ing and of some of its synonyms, all positive 
notions. But the explanation of a positive con- 
cept calls for the elucidation of its opposite. 
For opposites are, after a manner, correlated, 
and on this account involve, suggest and shed 
light upon, each other. Now the opposite of 
" being " is its negation, namely " non-being " or 



The Term Being n 

" nothing," of which " beinglessness " and " noth- 
ingness " form the abstract names. 

Nothing or non-being admits of a twofold 
meaning, according to the sense in which we 
take " thing " or " being " which it negatives. 
If these stand for that which actually exists, 
then " nothing " merely denotes the non-exist- 
ent, and includes whatever is not, yet can be: 
thus understood " nothing " is not an empty 
concept, as might perhaps seem at first sight, 
but the plenitude of all possible reality. " Noth- 
ing " taken in this sense is technically known as 
" positive " nothing. It has this meaning in the 
following verse found in the second book of 
Machabees : " I beseech thee, my son, look upon 
heaven and earth and all that is in them, and 
consider that God made them out of nothing and 
mankind also." 

But " nothing " has also another signification. 
It sometimes denotes the negation of " thing " 
or " being " in its broadest acceptation as that 
which can be ; in this case, it conveys the same 
meaning as the impossible, or that which neither 
exists nor can exist, and is, in philosophical 
terminology, styled " absolute nothing." To this 
region of absolute " beinglessness " must be rele- 
gated all absurdities, contradictions and incon- 
ceivabilities ; as a square circle, a thinking block 
of wood, a tree suffering pain, a finite God, and 
the like. They are all included under the fig- 



12 Being 

ments of the mind (entia rationis), mentioned 
before. Beinglessness of this sort is entirely 
barren; the very conception of a state of abso- 
lute nothingness ever obtaining, is itself an ab- 
surdity. For had such ever been the case, noth- 
ing would or could exist. 



CHAPTER SECOND 
Unity and Commonness of Being 

Summary: Inquiry outlined — Comprehension and ex- 
tension of ideas — Thesis : Concept of be- 
ing one in itself and common to all things 
— Preliminary remarks to thesis — Two 
exceptions taken — Proofs of thesis — An- 
swer to exceptions. 

10. Inquiry outlined. After having thus ex- 
plained the meaning of " being " and its opposite 
" nothing," let us now enter a little more deeply 
into this matter by determining some of the 
properties of being. 

In examining the concept of being, we are 
at once struck with its absolute universality. 
For the term being can be applied to everything. 
The question now forces itself upon the inquirer, 
Is being as thus referable to all things one and 
the same concept throughout, or is it manifold 
in its signification ? v 

ii. Comprehension and extension of ideas. 
But before going any further in our exposition 
of being, we must first briefly recall from Dia- 
lectics a few notions which we shall have fre- 
quent occasion of using and which, unless clearly 

i-3 



14 Being 

grasped, would seriously hamper us in our in- 
vestigations, namely the notions " comprehen- 
sion " and " extension " in their logical meaning. 

By the comprehension of a notion (or con- 
cept) we understand that which the notion 
comprises, namely the sum total of the attributes 
which go to make up its meaning. Thus the 
comprehension of " eagle," for instance, is, cor- 
poreal, living, irrational, feathered, rapacious 
biped, having strong talons and beak, remarkable 
for strength, size, graceful figure, keenness of 
vision, extraordinary flight, etc. Another name 
for the comprehension of a notion is " content." 
In fact, this term seems preferable, since its pre- 
vailing meaning suggests more readily than com- 
prehension, the sum total of the attributes con- 
stituting a given notion. For comprehension, 
according to its primary signification, denotes the 
act of grasping an object with the mind, whereas 
the radical meaning of content is all that which 
a thing contains. It also appears from the above 
explanation that the content of a notion is really 
nothing else than its meaning or definition; for 
what is the meaning or definition of a concep- 
tion but the totality of notes constituting it ? 

Extension, the other term to be explained, 
stands in very close relationship to content. It 
has a twofold meaning. In its primary signifi- 
cation it denotes the capacity which an idea 
possesses, of representing a greater or smaller 



Unity and Commonness of Being 15 

number of kinds, species, or individuals; or, to 
express it somewhat differently, it is the ap- 
plicability of an idea to a more or less wide 
range of objects. 

Thus understood, extension is a property of 
ideas. It is, as it were, the measure of an idea, 
its scope, breadth or sphere. Hence the terms 
" scope," " breadth," " sphere," when predicated 
of ideas, are used synonymously with extension. 

The word extension is chosen in the above 
logical signification, because for an idea to apply 
to a subject, is, after a manner, to "extend" 
to it. 

To illustrate what we have just said by an 
example: the idea "tree" has a larger exten- 
sion than the idea " oak," because the predica- 
bility of the former is greater than that of the 
latter ; in fact, " oak-tree " is contained within 
the scope of " tree." 

But it is not unusual to employ the word " ex- 
tension " for the objects themselves which can 
be ranked under a given concept. Thus the en- 
tire aggregate of trees viewed either as groups 
or as individuals makes up the extension of 
" tree." 

The objects classed under a certain idea are 
called the subjects of that idea, because the 
idea in question is predicable of these objects 
as its subjects. They are also sometimes named 
the subordinate parts or simply the subordinates 



1 6 Being 

of the idea comprising them. Thus, when I say, 
" The oak and the elm are trees," I regard 
" oak " and " elm " as subjects, subordinate to 
the concept " tree." 

Hitherto we have viewed comprehension and 
extension, each in itself. Considering them as 
related to one another, we discover this pecul- 
iarity about them, that the two vary in an in- 
verse ratio, that is to say, if the comprehension 
of an idea increases, its extension diminishes, 
and vice versa. For example, take the notion 
" man," and add to it the note " white " ; it is 
plain at once that by thus making the sum 
total of predicates larger, I narrow down the 
sphere of the applicability of the concept " man." 
For " white man " embraces fewer individuals 
than " man " alone. 

This inverse ratio between comprehension 
and extension, however, does not obtain, except 
when the new attribute (or mark) joined is 
such as belongs only to some of the individuals 
to which it is annexed : in other words when 
the mark in question is restrictive. 

For if it is not restrictive, but merely ex- 
plicative, that is, involved in the concept to 
which it is united, although not distinctly ex- 
pressed by it, then the above law regarding the 
inverse ratio of content and extension does not 
hold. Thus take the concept " rational being " 
and modify it by the accession of " endowed 



Unity and Commonness of Being ly 

with the power of speech," — " capable of per- 
ceiving the incongruous and giving expression to 
this perception by laughter " : we do not thereby 
lessen the number of individuals, of which the 
notion " rational being " alone is affirmable. 

12. Being one in itself and common to ail 
things. After this interruption, let us again take 
up the thread of our discussion where we began 
to inquire whether being as predicable of any 
thing whatever, is one and the same concept 
wherever applied, or whether it is manifold in 
its signification. It will serve the purpose of 
clearness to formulate in a thesis what we have 
to say on this subject. 

THESIS i 

The concept being is one in itself and 
common to all things. 

13. Preliminary remarks. When we affirm 
that the concept of being is one in itself, we 
want to say that it does not exhibit in its con- 
tent any of the determinations differentiating the 
objects of which it is predicated, but abstracts 
from all of them. We state this in refutation 
of certain philosophers who consider being as a 
sort of mosaic or agglomeration of all the ob- 
jects to which it can be applied. According to 
them, when I conceive being, I really represent to 



1 8 Being 

myself God, creatures, substance and accident, 
at least in a hazy and confused way. 

The unity attributed to being here is, of course, 
logical unity, of which we shall say a little more 
presently. 

In the second part of the thesis, we assert 
that the concept of being is " transcendental." 
A transcendental concept is one which is affirm- 
able of all things whatsoever, and hence, as it 
were, transcends or passes beyond, all other no- 
tions of a circumscribed scope of applicability. 
It is, then, opposed to a " universal " concept, 
which can, indeed, be attributed to many things, 
but not to all. 

Note also that we speak here principally of 
the objective concept, although what is true of 
it, can, with certain restrictions, be likewise ap- 
plied to the subjective. The subjective concept, 
as we know from Dialectics, is the act of the 
mind representing an object, whilst the objective, 
is this object as represented by the mind. 

14. Two exceptions taken to the unity and 
commonness of being. The statement embodied 
in our first thesis may perhaps seem to some 
self-evident, and its further elucidation be con- 
sidered a mere loss of time. But looking more 
closely into the matter, the case is not so simple, 
and the road before us not so smooth, as would 
appear at first sight. For if the concept " be- 
ing " is common to all things, then it must in 



Unity and Commonness of Being 19 

some way include all things; consequently it must 
receive, and, as it were, absorb into itself all the 
real differences by which things are distinguished 
one from another : but if so, how can it remain 
one? Hence, it would almost seem that oneness 
and commonness in respect to all things are ex- 
clusive of each other. Again, are there not cer- 
tain realities, such as the Uncreated and the 
created, substance and its accidental modifica- 
tions, which have no points of resemblance at 
all, and hence cannot enter into one common 
concept ? 

But let us first put our thesis on a firm basis 
and then see how we can dispose of the above 
seeming paradox and puzzle. 

15. First proof of the unity and common- 
ness of being. We prove our above assertion 
thus : In order that the mind may form a concept 
which is at once one and common to all things, 
there must, in the first place, be some sort of 
resemblance amongst all things, that renders it 
possible for the intellect to gather them all into 
one common notion ;- and secondly, the intellect 
must be able to unravel and separate the common 
element from the myriad forms through which 
things differ from one another. Now it cannot 
be denied that all realities do bear some sort of 
likeness to each other in one particular at least : 
they are all something, they are all opposed to 
nothing. The Lord Almighty and his lowliest 



2o Being 

handiwork are something: the one towering to 
infinite hights, it is true, and the other just 
rising above the abyss of nothingness : yet both 
have this in common that they are real, that 
they are not nothing. The human soul is a 
something, and so are its thoughts and aspira- 
tions which come and go whilst itself endures. 
However much the permanent soul and the fleet- 
ing thought and affection may differ, they are 
similar in this, that they are set over against 
the void of nothingness. 

There is then an element in which all things 
agree. But for the mind to conceive all things 
under one aspect, it is not enough that they 
should be alike in something; the intellect must, 
moreover, be able to disentangle the common 
feature from the multiform differences which 
diversify it: and this it can do. For it pos- 
sesses the power of abstraction in its highest 
perfection. By the aid of this power, the in- 
tellectual faculty can lop off, one after another, 
all the differentiating marks between things, until 
it arrives at a concept, simple, all-embracing, in 
which all entities agree. And this is the con- 
cept of totally indeterminate being, of being in 
general, of " ens ut sic," in the Schoolmen's 
phrase. Take, for example, the concept man: 
drop, one by one, all his distinguishing char- 
acteristics, such as rational, sensitive, living, cor- 
poreal, substantial, and you will come to the no- 



Unity and Commonness of Being 21 

tion being, beyond which you cannot go. The 
concept of being then is one in itself and com- 
mon to all things. 

16. Second proof of the unity and com- 
monness of being. In the argument just given, 
we deduced our conclusion from a consideration 
of the things of which being is predicated. We 
can arrive at the same result by analyzing the 
concept of being itself. 

If we gaze attentively at our stock of ideas, 
we shall discover amongst them one which dif- 
fers from all the rest in this, that it is entirely 
indeterminate, stripped of all specifications and 
particularizations whatever; it is neither God 
nor creature, substance, nor accident : it expresses 
mere opposition to nothing; it represents not- 
nothing, something, being in general. That we 
possess such an idea, depicting just that and 
nothing more, is a fact of consciousness, which 
no sincere observer looking into himself, will 
deny. Now, this concept thus limited in its con- 
tent to a minimum, is for that very reason broad- 
est in its applicability to determinate realities; 
for content and breadth of an idea, are in in- 
verse ratio (No. 12). There cannot be anything 
of which it is not predicable. For whatever has 
reality, is by this very fact placed in opposition 
to nothing. Whence we infer that one and the 
same concept " being " is common to all things. 

From the preceding proofs, it follows by way 



22 Being 

of corollary, that being is a simple concept, not in 
the sense that, like spirit, it is without physical 
parts, but in this sense that it expresses and 
comprises but one note or attribute, irresolvable 
into any other notes or attributes. For were it 
not so, it could not be the " common " predicate 
of " all " things, since nothing can be affirmed of 
its own parts. 

17. Answer to the two exceptions taken 
to the unity and commonness of being. We 
must now reply to the two difficulties set down 
at the beginning of the thesis. We stated there 
that if the concept of being is of altogether com- 
mon predicability, then it must likewise include 
the differences discriminating one thing from 
another, since they, too, are something; but if 
so, being apparently ceases to be one; hence it 
would seem impossible for being to be one in 
itself and yet common to all things. 

In answer to this, we readily grant that being 
must comprise the differences of things ; not, 
however, just as ■" differences," but as " being," 
that is, in so far as even these differences are 
alike. Thus take the two marks distinguishing 
God and creatures, viz. " self-existent " and " de- 
riving existence from another." The concept be- 
ing comprises both of them as " being," but not 
just as " determining " attributes. Hence we see 
that being can embrace all the differences, and 
yet remain one in itself. 



Unity and Commonness of Being 23 

The other objection to our thesis, namely that 
there are certain realities which seemingly have 
nothing in common, has been already disposed of 
in our proofs. For we pointed out there ex- 
pressly that this is a mistake, since the Infinite 
and the finite, substance and accident, agree at 
least in this that they are all something, that 
they stand opposed to mere nothing. 



CHAPTER THIRD 
Unity Of Being Not Real 

Summary: Question stated — ■ Concept of unity — 
Divisions of unity — Real unity — Individ- 
ual unity — Essential unity — Logical 
unity — Manner of obtaining concepts pos- 
sessing logical unity — Prescision subjec- 
tive and objective — Distinction real and 
logical — -Logical distinction purely mental 
and not purely mental — Foundation of 
distinction not purely mental — Foundation 
either perfect or imperfect — Foundation 
of objective prescision — Purely mental 
distinction in its relation to prescision — 
Being not really distinct from its modes 
— Introductory remarks to proofs — 
Meaning of term "mode" — Modes of be- 
ing four in number — Proofs of thesis — 
Some objections answered. 

18. Question stated. We have then shown 
the concept of being to be one in itself; it still 
remains for us to prove that the kind of unity 
attributed to it, is logical unity, and not real. 

19. Concept of unity. But in order to have 
a clearer understanding and a firmer grasp of 
the question of the unity of being, a question 

24 



Unity of Being Not Real 25 

which shall come up for consideration again and 
again under various forms, we must briefly de- 
velop the concept of unity, as well as give some 
of its main divisions. 

We call a thing one when it is not divided 
within itself, that is, when its constituent ele- 
ments are not separated from one another. In- 
troduce division into a thing, and it ceases to 
be one and becomes many. Your watch is one 
object, as long as its parts, case, face, hands, 
wheels, spring, etc., are united ; take them apart, 
and you have no more one, but a number of 
objects. Hence in general a thing is one when 
it is undivided in itself; and consequently, unity 
and indivision are synonymous terms. 

Sometimes the words " and divided from all 
else," are joined to the definition of unity in 
general, so that " the one " is said to be that 
which is undivided in itself and divided from all 
else. If this is done, we no longer regard the 
one exclusively as it is in itself, but we view it 
relatively, that is, as opposed to others, together 
with which it does, or, at least, may exist. This 
quality or state of " being other," or " otherness," 
as it is sometimes called, is not, however, of 
the essence, but merely a necessary property of 
unity or oneness. 

20. Divisions of unity — Real unity. Let 
us now pass on to the main divisions of unity. 
Unity is either real or logical. Real unity is the 



26 Being 

unity which is found in things independently of 
the mind. It is either individual or essential 
(formal). 

21. Individual unity. Individual unity con- 
sists in this that an individual is incapable of 
self-multiplication as an individual, that is to 
say, of becoming two or more individuals which 
are all the same original individual. To express 
this idea in technical language, individual unity 
is the indivisibility of an individual into other 
individuals identical with itself. Thus the fact 
that Julius Caesar could not turn himself into 
two or more Julius Caesars, each of whom was 
the same original Julius Caesar, constitutes his 
individual unity. 

That every individual is one in this sense, is 
too evident to need proof. It follows from the 
very concept of an individual; for, an individual 
is that which exists distinct from everything else ; 
it is " this " particular, determinate being, and 
not " that " or any other. 

22. Essential unity. Essential unity is that 
property of an essence, on account of which it 
is impossible for it to be any other essence ex- 
cept the one it is. In strict philosophical phrase- 
ology, it is the indivisibility of an essence into 
other essences identical with itself. It is also 
called " formal " unity, because with the School- 
men essence and form are synonymous. To 



Unity of Being Not Real 27 

illustrate our definition by an example — it is 
impossible for the nature (or essence) of a stag, 
as long as it remains the nature of a stag, to be 
that of a wolf or serpent or butterfly. 

23. Logical unity. Logical unity, which we 
opposed to real, is the unity proper to a concept 
expressive of a nature common to many things 
and multipliable in them. Thus " man " as a 
general concept, has logical unity. For it is one 
as existing in the ideal or logical order through 
abstraction; and it is capable of being multiplied 
or becoming many in the individuals of which it 
can be affirmed. 

These few, brief remarks on the kinds of unity 
will suffice here. A fuller account of them is 
given in the treatise on the " Attributes of Be- 
ing." 

24. Manner of obtaining concepts possess- 
ing logical unity. But there is still another 
point, closely connected with logical unity, which 
must be touched on here, before we can give an 
intelligent exposition of many of the subtler 
questions about being. It regards the manner of 
obtaining concepts possessing logical unity. 

25. Prescision in metaphysics. Scholastic 
Philosophers tell us that concepts possessing log- 
ical unity are obtained by what they call " ob- 
jective prescision," a rather strange sounding and 
at first sight meaningless expression. I^et us 



28 Being 

first explain what is meant by the phrase and 
then see how we can best clothe the thought 
underlying it in words. 

If we inspect our store of ideas with care, we 
will discover that amongst them there are a good 
many which, though different in content or mean- 
ing, yet relate to attributes that are altogether 
identical in the object itself. Thus take the two 
concepts, " substance " and " corporeal " : it is 
plain that as verified in bodies, they are identical, 
since substance itself is corporeal. Yet the mean- 
ings of the two are quite different. For " sub- 
stance " denotes independence of a subject of 
inhesion and " corporeal " is the same as having 
parts. 

26. Subjective Prescision. The mind then 
has the power to separate or break up what is 
one and the same in the physical order, into two 
or more distinct concepts, or, if you will, it is 
able to prescind or abstract one of two or more 
attributes which are physically identical. To ex- 
press the same under still another form : the 
mind can represent one of several attributes 
which are in reality identical, and disregard or 
turn away from the rest. Now this process of 
considering apart from each other attributes iden- 
tified in the object we call " subjective pre- 
scision." 

This so-called subjective prescision is really 
nothing else than a species of abstraction; for 



Unity of Being Not Real 29 

abstraction — a broader term than prescision — 
embraces the power of the intellect to view apart 
as well things merely joined together, as at- 
tributes which are strictly identical. Thus if I 
fix my attention upon a man's eye without noting 
the other members of his body, the mental process 
by which this is effected, is called abstraction, 
whereas if I consider his eye merely as a living 
substance and neglect its sensibility, the process 
is named prescision. 

27. Objective Prescision, But the word 
prescision is not only applied to the subjective 
process of prescinding identical properties; it 
also designates the condition or resulting state 
of an attribute existing separated from others 
with which it is identified : and this is what the 
Schoolmen mean by " objective prescision." 
The qualification " objective " is added to " pre- 
scision," because the " object" of thought is sub- 
jected to a process of division in the ideal order. 
Thus when the concavity of a circle presents 
itself to your mind apart from its convexness, 
you have an instance of what is meant by " ob- 
jective prescision." 

Let it be noted here that the terms abstraction 
and prescision in this last sense are very un- 
common: the phrase "objective prescision," is 
likewise extremely rare, in fact, it would seem, 
it is never used except perhaps in translations 
from the Latin ; for this reason it will be pref- 



30 Being 

erable, where at all feasible, to give these ex- 
pressions another turn by employing some cir- 
cumlocution. 

But the question now arises, do attributes 
physically identical really exist separate in 
thought? Yes, they do; of this there can be no 
doubt; it is an incontestable fact of conscious- 
ness. It only remains for us to show how this 
can come about. How is it possible for one at- 
tribute, even in the ideal order, to shut out an- 
other with which it is, in reality, identical, and 
present itself as altogether freed from its own 
self, so to speak? It is plain that this cannot 
take place, unless these physically identical quali- 
ties are first rendered distinct in the ideal order ; 
for separation presupposes distinction. Hence 
the question, how can two (or more) physically 
identical attributes exist apart in thought, re- 
solves itself into this other, how can the mind 
render distinct things which are in themselves 
indistinct? Berkeley, it would seem, thought 
that there was no answer to this ; for he says : 
" I deny that I can abstract one from another, 
or conceive separately, those qualities which it 
is impossible should exist separated." This, 
however, is a mistake. 

28. Distinction. But to settle this question 
satisfactorily, we must first briefly define what 
is meant by " distinction " in general, and then 
enumerate its various divisions, noting at the 



Unity of Being Not Reed 31 

same time such of their properties, as bear on 
the matter at issue. 

" Distinction " is opposed to identity, and 
hence denotes an absence or want of identity; 
or, to give a definition of it in the concrete, we 
might say, that whenever one entity is not the 
other, we have distinction of some sort. 

29. Distinction real and conceptual. Dis- 
tinction is either " real " or " conceptual " ac- 
cording as the lack of identity belongs to the 
" things in themselves " independently of the 
mind, or else is only in the " concepts," which 
the intellect forms regarding the " same " thing. 
Thus one of two apples is not the same as the 
other, without any reference to the intellect ; but 
" Demosthenes " and " the greatest orator of an- 
cient Greece " are really identical ; and the dis- 
tinction exists only in the two concepts which I 
have of the same man. 

30. Division of conceptual distinction. 
Conceptual, sometimes named logical, distinction 
may be divided into two further classes, of pri- 
mary importance in matters philosophical, known 
in Scholastic phraseology as the " distinctio ra- 
tionis ratiocinantis " and the " distinctio rationis 
ratiocinatae," expressions which are sometimes 
met with in their Latin form in English treatises. 

31. Conceptual distinction purely mental. 
The " distinctio rationis ratiocinantis " (literally, 
the distinction of the thinking or reasoning 



32 Being 

mind), is called in English " purely " conceptual 
or " purely " mental distinction, as being the re- 
sult altogether of the action of the reasoning 
power without any grounds for the distinction 
except such as are extrinsic to the object. We 
simply repeat the same idea or make one idea 
do duty for two, with some slight change in the 
mode of expression. 

Thus, the foundation for my distinguishing 
between the two ideas " Napoleon " and " Bona- 
parte/' is the fact that the French Emperor 
bears two names; and this circumstance is, of 
course, external to the person signified. The 
same is to be said in regard to the distinction 
between the object defined (e. g. man) and its 
definition (rational animal), and, in general, be- 
tween two or more concepts having the same 
content, but each emphasizing a different note 
in that content ; as when I conceive the same 
right angled triangle by two ideas, the one mak- 
ing the right angle stand out clearly, and the 
other throwing the hypotenuse into strong re- 
lief, without, however, altogether shutting out 
the remaining constituents of the figure in ques- 
tion. For, in these cases, the basis for the dis- 
tinction between the two (or more) concepts, is 
not anything in the object itself, but, it is to be 
looked for in something extrinsic to it, namely 
the greater or less clearness and distinctness 
with which the attributes composing the contents 



Unity of Being Not Real 33 

of the ideas present themselves to the mind. 

32. Conceptual distinction not purely men- 
tal. We now come to the distinction which is 
called " distinctio rationis ratiocinatae " in Scho- 
lastic terminology, and, in English, conceptual 
distinction not purely mental. 

It differs from the preceding in this, that here 
the foundation for forming several concepts of 
one and the same reality, is not " outside," but 
" in " the object itself. Hence it is, that phi- 
losophers often style it conceptual distinction 
"founded on reality" (i. e. the object). 

33. Foundation of conceptual distinction 
not purely mental. But what is the foundation 
in the thing itself which gives rise to this dis- 
tinction? In other words, what is the suitable- 
ness on the part of the object which renders it 
possible for the intellect to distinguish attributes 
that are physically indistinct? This is the prob- 
lem that awaits our solution. 

To clear up this point, we must first direct 
attention to the fact that every object is pos- 
sessed of many perfections which are physically 
identical. The same object is, as it were, equiva- 
lent to many realities which exist in it in perfect 
identity, yet may be found separate and differ- 
ently combined in other objects. Thus take a 
human individual : it is made up of the perfec- 
tions, " bodily substance," " life," " sensation " 
and " reason," all identified. Yet bodily sub- 



34 Being 

stance is also found in stones, vegetative life in 
plants, and sensation in brute animals. 

Now this equivalence of one and the same 
thing to many perfections is the (main) founda- 
tion or ground which renders identical attributes 
distinguishable and enables the mind to apprehend 
them by means of divers concepts. 

34. Perfect and imperfect foundation of 
conceptual distinction not purely mental. 
This foundation, however, is not always of the 
same character ; for it may be either " perfect " 
or " imperfect." It is perfect when the perfec- 
tions to which one and the same thing is equiva- 
lent, are of such a nature that any one can be 
conceived adequately or fully without the com- 
panion perfections with which it is identified; 
and it is imperfect, if such is not the case. A 
second way of testing the character of the foun- 
dation is, to see whether either of, say, two 
identical perfections can exist in a different ob- 
ject without the other. If it can, the foundation 
for the conceptual distinction is perfect; if it 
cannot, then, as before, it is imperfect. Thus, 
human nature offers a perfect foundation for 
the distinction between animality and rationality, 
since animality is perfectly realizable in brute 
animals without the rationality accompanying it 
in man; and animality can be fully conceived 
without conceiving rationality. For the defini- 
tion of animality, namely, " the state of being 



Unity of Being Not Real 35 

sentient," is altogether different from that of ra- 
tionality, which is " the character of being ra- 
tional." 

Let us add an instance where the foundation 
for the distinction between two concepts is im- 
perfect. Take the two attributes of God, Justice 
and Mercy; they are, indeed, conceivable one 
without the other, yet not perfectly. For if we 
analyze God's Mercy, we will find that, being 
divine, it is infinite, and therefore includes all 
other possible perfections, one of which is, of 
course, Justice. It is also plain that, unlike e. g. 
animality, which exists outside of man in brute 
beasts, none of the Divine attributes can ever 
be found in any other being except God. It is 
this kind of distinction, which obtains between 
being and its determinations. 

35. Foundation of objective prescision. 
Let us now return to " objective prescision " or 
the separation of physically identical attributes. 
Its explanation is now clear, since what holds 
true of conceptual distinction not purely mental, 
applies likewise to the separation of physically 
identical attributes by the mind : both the one 
and the other have the same foundation; for if 
two qualities identical in themselves, can be ren- 
dered distinct in conception, it is plain that one 
of them can exist apart in thought from the 
other. Hence the foundation for the separation 
of physically identical attributes (or objective 



36 Being 

prescision) is likewise the equivalence of one 
and the same object to two or more perfections. 

The separation of physically identical attributes 
in the ideal order taking place, as it does, in 
virtue of something in the object, is also some- 
times called virtual prescision by the Schoolmen ; 
just as the distinction which paves the way to 
it, is styled virtual distinction. 

Note also, that, according as the aforenamed 
foundation is perfect or imperfect, the separation 
existing between the identical attributes of an 
object in conception, is likewise accounted per- 
fect or imperfect, just as distinction on the same 
score is divided into perfect and imperfect. 

36. Purely mental distinction in its rela- 
tion to prescision. The purely mental distinc- 
tion (rationis ratio cinantis) likewise involves 
some sort of prescision which, however, implies 
no separation of identical attributes, but consists 
in this, that of two concepts having altogether 
the same contents, the one emphasizes some at- 
tribute (or attributes), which the other repre- 
sents only in a somewhat dim and less marked 
manner. Hence, the process of prescinding, in 
this last case, means merely this, that one no- 
tion represents less clearly and distinctly certain 
attributes which another brings out prominently. 
Thus " domestic animal of the feline kind, fond 
of mice, characterized by a plaintive cry, called 
mewing, and sometimes amusing itself by pur- 



Unity of Being Not Real 37 

ring," expresses the same as " cat," the only 
difference between the two being, that " cat " 
conveys only obscurely the marks and peculiari- 
ties, on which the other more explicit concept 
lays stress. 

Prescision thus taken is a purely subjective 
method of procedure with no foundation in the 
object. 

37. Being not really distinct from its 
modes. These remarks having been premised, 
we shall now gradually unfold our teaching in 
regard to the kind of unity possessed by being. 

Let us start our investigation of this subject 
with the following thesis. 



THESIS 2 

It is self-contradictory to suppose 
that there exists an extra-mental dis- 
tinction of any sort between being 
and its determinations. 

38. Introductory remarks to proofs. In 

this thesis we deny that indeterminate being is 
possessed of real or physical unity or, in other 
words, that it is really and physically distinct 
from its modes or determinations. We say this 
to refute the Scotists (or followers of Dun 
Scotus) who hold that there exists an extra- 
mental distinction between being and any of its 



3& Being 

modes, v. g. " existing in itself." This distinc- 
tion they choose to style " distinctio formalis 
ex natura rei." They use the term " formalis " 
to point out the distinction between what they 
call "formalities" or metaphysical grades (No. 
57), as rationality and animality. The qualifying 
phrase " ex natura rei " means the same as " in 
external nature " and may be rendered into Eng- 
lish by " extra-mental." 

But before taking up the proofs of our thesis 
and discussing the objections, we shall explain 
the meaning of the term " mode." 

39. Meaning of term " mode." Mode, in 
its widest signification, denotes the same as 
modification or limitation; it is something which 
has no independent existence, but clings to an- 
other as its determination. Thus, e. g., we say 
that heat is a mode of motion, figure a mode of 
an extended body, fluidity and solidity modes of 
the existence of metals, and the like. 

But in the present case we regard mode in 
a specific sense. We mean by it a concept de- 
termining or modifying another, and that in a 
very particular manner. To understand this, 
note that a modifying concept is generally of 
such a nature as to amplify or enlarge the con- 
tents of the notion to which it is affixed; it 
expresses something new, not contained in the 
concept to which it is added. A qualifying con- 
cept of this kind is called a " differentia " and 



Unity of Being Not Real 39 

the qualified notion, a " genus." But it some- 
times happens, that the concept joined to another 
as a determination of its meaning, does not en- 
large its contents; it adds nothing new, but 
merely brings out clearly the various states and 
conditions in which a thing can be found. Now, 
whenever one concept qualifies another in this 
way, it is called a " mode " in contradistinction 
to a " differentia." 

To illustrate : if I say, " The soul is a spiritual 
substance," the concept " spiritual " adds some- 
thing new to the notion " substance " ; something 
not included in it before ; hence, " spiritual " is 
a true differentia relatively to " substance." 
But when I state " God is an absolutely inde- 
pendent being" (ens a se), and "creature is a 
being existing dependency on God " (ens ab 
alio), the additions "absolutely independent" 
and " existing in dependence on another," do not 
amplify the content of the concept " being " ; 
they add nothing new to being or distinct from 
it: they merely make known to us the manner 
in which God and creatures possess being. The 
force of this last Example will perhaps not be 
fully appreciated until we have gone a little fur- 
ther in our investigations, when this point will 
be professedly treated. 

40. Modes of being four in number. The 
modes with which we have to do in this treatise 
are four, namely, "self-existent" (a se), " de- 



40 Being 

riving existence from another" (ab alio), "ex- 
isting in itself" (per se), and "existing in 
another as in a subject" (in alio); for these 
four qualifications affect being immediately, 
since being as being is either self-existent or de- 
rived from another, independent of a subject of 
inhesion or dependent on such a subject: hence 
they are determinations of being as being or of 
being properly so called. Other additions to be- 
ing (such as spiritual, bodily, living, sensitive, 
rational) are modifications of more or less deter- 
minate being, and consequently are determina- 
tions of being only in an improper sense. 
Whenever, then, we speak of determinations of 
being, the expression is to be understood in its 
strict meaning, unless the contrary is expressly 
stated, or the context warrants a different ac- 
ceptation. 

Should any one feel annoyed at the many un- 
proved assertions we have been making, let him 
bear in mind that, at this stage of our disquisi- 
tion, we are merely explaining and defining; 
afterwards we hope to substantiate our now un- 
supported statements. 

41. There is no extra-mental distinction 
between being and its modes: First proof. 
We are now ready to prove our thesis, namely 
that there is no extra-mental distinction between 
being and its modes. The two arguments which 
we shall give, though applying to all modifica- 



Unity of Being Not Real 41 

tions of being whatsoever, are principally intro- 
duced to shed light on the relation of being to 
its four so-called modes. 

We proceed thus : If being is distinct from 
its modes (or primary determinations) outside 
of thought, then we rightly infer that, however 
closely united it may be to them, still, when re- 
garded in itself in the physical order, it is alto- 
gether clear of all of them ; and if clear of 
them, it is likewise clear of all further modifica- 
tions superadded to them. Consequently, being 
as it exists independently of the mind, would 
be wholly indeterminate; we would, therefore, 
have to admit the presence of a reality which 
possesses physical universality: a thing which is 
utterably inconceivable. 

Suppose there were such a thing as a universal 
animal outside the mind, how would it look ? 
It would be an exceedingly strange being in 
very truth! For it would neither be mammal 
nor bird nor fish nor reptile nor insect nor any 
other kind of animal. It would neither be a 
myriapod nor a centipede nor a quadruped nor 
a biped nor apodat Its skin would neither be 
covered with hair nor wool nor feathers nor 
scales, nor would it be altogether bare. The 
queer creature would neither walk nor fly nor 
swim nor crawl, nor would it be fixed to one 
spot. In a word, it would be destitute of every- 
thing except what is common to all animals. 



42 Being 

What an odd monster to behold! A veritable 
chimera indeed ! 

This delineation of a universal existing in 
physical nature is intended merely as an appeal 
to common sense. It will suffice, however, to 
convince us what a senseless medley of irrec- 
oncilable notions a universal leaving the re- 
gions of thought to take up its abode in the real 
order, would be. 

If then any one wants to conceive " being " 
as denuded of all its determinations independ- 
ently of the intellect, he must be prepared to 
accept imaginings similar to the above. 

42. There is no extra-mental distinction 
between being and its modes: Second proof. 
We can also regard the refutation of the Sco- 
tistical distinction from another point of view, 
thus : If the aforenamed modes (namely, ex- 
isting of itself, deriving existence from another, 
etc.) are distinct from being as it exists in the 
real order, then they are evidently not being. 
And if they are not being, what are they ? Non- 
being, nothing ! But " nothing " cannot be a de- 
termining mode. Hence, the Scotistic theory 
destroys the very concept of determining modes. 

43. Some objections answered. To put our 
thesis on a still more solid footing, let us ex- 
amine a few objections that might be brought 
against it. 

If being and its determining modes, it might 



Unity of Being Not Real 43 

be said, are not distinct in the external object, 
then it would follow that things are differen- 
tiated from one another by the very same 
reality in which they agree. For, to take a par- 
ticular instance, God and creatures agree in this, 
that both possess being, and they differ in this, 
that the being of God is altogether independent, 
and that of the creature wholly dependent on 
him. Now if being is not distinct from its de- 
termining modes " independent " and " depend- 
ent," then it would be at once the ground why 
creatures resemble God and differ from him. 
But how can this be? Is not this a patent con- 
tradiction? In fact, our contention, it might be 
further urged, would make God and creatures 
identical, since both would be undistinguished 
from the same reality " being." 

The objection, subtle though it may seem, is 
by no means insolvable. It seems to hinge on 
an ambiguous use of the term " agree." For 
when we say that two things agree in something, 
we often mean that they are identical in a cer- 
tain property or quality. Thus, if I tell you 
that the two roses 1 hold in my hand agree in 
color, I want to signify that they are identical 
in color, i. e. that they can be represented by 
means of one common concept, viz. red color. 
The identity in this case is, of course, logical, 
not real. 

It will be readily granted that in the meaning 



44 Being 

just given, there is no contradiction in supposing 
God and creatures to agree and differ by rea- 
son of the same reality. For agreement or 
identity here, has reference to the logical, and 
diversity to the real order; and there can be no 
contradiction unless the same predicate is af- 
firmed and denied of the same thing, and that, 
too, in the same sense. 

But some one might demur at our answer and 
say, how can there be identity in the logical or 
ideal order, when there is only diversity in the 
real? 

We need not go far for a reply to this. For 
in order to have such agreement or identity of 
divers things in the logical order, it is enough 
that there should be some foundation for it in 
reality: and such there is in the present case, 
namely resemblance between the objects con- 
ceived as identical. 

This leads us naturally to the other signification 
of the word " agree." Sometimes this term also 
denotes the same as " resemble " ; thus when I 
regard two friends as agreeing in disposition, 
my meaning is, that they resemble each other in 
their natural bent. Hence the statement " God 
and creatures agree in the very same entity by 
which they are distinguished," can mean that 
the same principle is at once the ground of the 
similarity and dissimilarity, or the resemblance 
and the want of resemblance between God and 



Unity of Being Not Real 45 

creatures. This resemblance is, of course, only 
imperfect. 

But here a serious difficulty presents itself. 
For as these two, similarity and dissimilarity, 
have both reference to the same real order, it 
would seem, as if, in this second sense of the 
verb " to agree," there were a contradiction 
after all in asserting that the very same real- 
ity, say of creatures, should be at once the 
reason why it resembles God and differs from 
him. 

There is, however, nothing inconsistent in this 
statement. For one and the same reality may be 
equivalent to different perfections of such a 
character, that on account of one of them it is 
similar to something else, and on account of 
another, it is dissimilar to the same. Thus, 
" white " agrees with " red " in color in gen- 
eral, but differs from " red " in what is peculiar 
to it, namely, " whiteness," and this for the rea- 
son that " white " embraces two perfections, 
color and whiteness, within itself, which differ, 
indeed, in concept to some extent, but are not 
exclusive of one another in reality. In the same 
manner, God and the creature may resemble each 
other in being and differ in the modes of being, 
although being and its modes are but one and 
the same identical perfection. Hence there is 
no contradiction in the assertion that " God and 
creatures are distinguished by the same entity in 



46 Being 

which they agree," in either of the two above 
meanings of the statement. 

The explanation given also disposes of the 
further inference from our teaching that, if the 
modes differentiating God and creatures are 
not distinct from being extra-mentally, we would 
seem to identify God and creatures. Let us not 
be needlessly alarmed at this bugbear of pan- 
theism : as long as God and creatures are iden- 
tical in being only in concept, and merely re- 
semble each other in the real order, the deduction 
of our deifying the universe is utterly unwar- 
rantable. If the identity referred to were real, 
then, indeed, we could not repel the charge of 
pantheism. But as the matter stands, it is the 
defenders of an extra-mental distinction between 
being and its modes, who lay themselves open 
to that charge. For if, as they claim, " being " 
exists outside the mind stripped of all its modes, 
and hence also of individual existence, it is an 
entity common to all things. Consequently, the 
same being which is in me, is also in God in- 
dependently of thought, and this is to make all 
things God, or else lower God to the level of 
the creature. 

This last captious puzzle is sometimes pro- 
posed under a slightly different form, and that 
even seriously, thus : If being in general is 
identified with its modes, then these modes can 
be nothing else than being in general. For a 



Unity of Being Not Real 47 

thing is that with which it is identified. But if 
so, there can be no variety and diversity among 
things, an inference altogether false. 

There are more flaws than one in this process 
of reasoning. For, in the first place, if being 
is identified with its modes, the modes are also 
identified with it; and hence, I have as much 
right to say that, on this supposition, nothing 
exists except the modes, and that being vanishes 
from them altogether. This much by way of re- 
joinder. 

But to answer directly: it would rather seem 
that if two realities different in concept are iden- 
tified, the result should be a third reality, sharing 
the perfections of both. And so, in fact, it is. 
Thus if you combine " being " and " self-exist- 
ent " into one, the outcome is God, who is at once 
being and self-existent. In a similar manner, 
by uniting " being " and " deriving existence 
from another," the compound concept " creat- 
ure " is formed, of which both " being " and 
" deriving existence from another " are predica- 
te. 

To illustrate by a case not at all parallel, it 
is true, yet somewhat analogous ; if you pour 
wine and water into a goblet, the contents will 
not be simply wine, nor simply water, but a 
mixture of the two. 

It further follows that by thus identifying 
" being " with " self-existent " and with " deriv- 



48 Being 

ing existence from another/' there result two 
complete objects, God and creature, which are 
similar in the real order of things and identical 
in the logical, just what we have contended for 
all along. 



CHAPTER FOURTH 

Inclusion of the Modes in Being 

Summary: The problem stated — Thesis: Being in- 
cludes its modes at least as being, but it 
expresses them only as being — The meta- 
physical order — Being in the metaphys- 
ical order — A concept may include a 
perfection without expressing it — 
Proof of thesis. 

44. The problem stated. Being then is not 
physically distinct from its determining modes ; 
but is it not so at least metaphysically? Our 
answer is, no. Let us state what we think on 
this point more explicitly in the following thesis. 

THESIS 3 

The abstract concept of being, and 
hence being as it exists in the meta- 
physical order, contains the four pri- 
mary modes at least as being; but it 
expresses them only as being, and in 
no other way. 

45. The metaphysical order. Before we 
prove this proposition we must first explain what 

49 



50 Being 

the metaphysical order is. Its nature will be 
best understood by contrasting it with the phys- 
ical, to which it is opposed. 

The physical order is the state of existence 
which things have independently of the mind, 
whereas the metaphysical regards these same 
things as having undergone certain changes 
through the action of the intellect. Thus, if we 
consider a lily as it is out of thought, we view 
it as it exists in the physical order ; but the same 
belongs to the sphere of metaphysics, if we con- 
template it as having been transformed by the 
operation of the mind, e. g. as a lily in general, 
and hence as shorn by a process of mental ab- 
straction of its individuating marks. We must 
not, however, imagine that the metaphysical 
order deals with mere chimeras or figments of 
the mind; no, it has to do with the real just as 
much as the physical order has. The only differ- 
ence between the two orders is, that whereas the 
physical has respect to some one thing together 
with all that belongs to it, the metaphysical ex- 
hibits the same thing as isolated and away from, 
one or more realities, which form part and parcel 
with it in external nature. 

As regards the term " metaphysical " (fiera 
tct cf>vo-iKa), it was first used by the followers 
of Aristotle as a name for those writings of 
their master which came after (perd) his treatise 
on physics. But since what follows physics, and 



Inclusion of the Modes in Being 51 

is, after a fashion, built upon it, may be said 
to pass above and beyond the region of the 
physical, metaphysics came to denote the abstract 
and universal as distinguished from the concrete 
and determinate; and this is now its ordinary 
signification. It has also several other mean- 
ings, which it does not concern us to notice in 
this place. 

The metaphysical order is also called the log- 
ical (in a restricted sense), ideal, supersensuous 
or hyperphysical. 

46. Being considered in the metaphysical 
order. Let us now apply the above to the con- 
cept of being. Being may, then, be regarded 
in a twofold state, namely first, as it is in itself 
out of the mind or in the physical order, and 
secondly, as it is when subjected to the prescind- 
ing action of the intellect or in the metaphysical 
order. We have done with being under the 
former aspect. We now come to consider it 
from the second point of view. We must show, 
as stated in our thesis, that the concept of be- 
ing, even in the metaphysical order, includes its 
determining modes at least as being, but that it 
represents them only as being. 

47. A concept may include a perfection 
without expressing it. To avoid confusion, 
note that it is not the same for a concept to 
include a perfection, and to express or represent 
the same. It may include something without 



52 Being 

representing it, though not vice versa. Thus, 
the antecedent of a syllogism, indeed, contains 
the conclusion, yet it does not express it as such ; 
for if it did, no process of ratiocination would 
be needed for inferring it. To illustrate this 
point by a rather homely example : a purse may 
contain money without necessarily indicating it. 
— Perhaps you reply this is true, but then a 
purse is not a concept; it would seem that for 
a concept to include something and to express it, 
are altogether the same. — We answer that this 
may be so, when there is question of the sub- 
jective concept (the purely mental representa- 
tion) ; but here we speak of the objective (the 
object represented) ; and it is this which we 
affirm can contain something without at the same 
time expressing or presenting it to the mind. 

48. Proof of thesis. Let it also be remarked 
that it is our intention here only, to settle whether 
being contains its modes as being ; whether it 
contains them in any other way, we shall decide 
in one of the following theses (thesis 5). 

Our thesis is a direct corollary of what pre- 
cedes; we show it thus: The concept of being, 
as it exists in the metaphysical order, evidently 
includes all reality : for otherwise it would not 
be common to all things (thes. 1). Now the 
modes of being are, of course, real; since, were 
they not so, they would be nothing (thes. 2). 
Hence being must include them at least as reality 



Inclusion of the Modes in Being 53 

or as being, in the metaphysical order. And it 
expresses them, too, not indeed as modes — for 
in that case the concept of being would not be 
one in itself (thes. 1) — but as being. We can- 
not free being of its modes by any amount of 
abstraction : the connection between being and 
them is of so close and unique a character, that 
any attempt at complete separation is doomed to 
failure; in fact, it would involve the very de- 
struction of being, since being is nothing else 
than its determining modes vaguely and obscurely 
conceived. 

Such is not the case with most other notions 
and their modifications. Take the concept ani- 
mal which is determined by the addition of 
rational. Animal, in no way, contains rational-; 
for rationality is not animality, whereas any of 
the modes of being is being. Animality is, in- 
deed, identical with rationality in the physical 
order. But it does not include it in the meta- 
physical. 



CHAPTER FIFTH 

Being Not a Genus 

Summary: Transition to a new thesis — Thesis: 
Being not a genus — Precise force of 
terms, species, genus, and differentia — 
Proofs of thesis — Confirmation of thesis 
by the authority of St. Thomas — Being 
not any of the five predicables. 

49. Transition to a new thesis. The pre- 
ceding considerations have paved the way for 
our next thesis, viz. : 

THESIS 4 

The concept of being cannot be re- 
garded as a genus. 

50. Precise force of terms species, genus, 
and differentia. Before we show the intimate 
connection between our present and the preced- 
ing thesis, we must briefly explain the precise 
meaning and force of the term " genus " as 
well as of the related notions " species " and 
" differentia " ; for they all bear on the solution 
of the question mooted. 

54 



Being Not a Genus 55 

The " species " expresses the whole essence 
of an object or group of objects; the "genus" 
represents the attributes common to two or more 
species ; and the " differentia " sets forth the 
mark by which any one of these species differs 
from the others. Thus, " vertebrate " is the 
genus under which mammals, birds, reptiles, 
amphibians etc., fall as species. The essential 
element distinguishing any one of these classes 
from the rest, is its differentia. 

Now, for a genus to be truly such, it is re- 
quired that the differentiating marks added to 
constitute the various classes under it, should 
be altogether extrinsic to it, that is to say, neither 
contain it nor be contained in it. If such is not 
the case, the common attribute is not considered 
a genus in the proper sense of the word, but a 
quasi-genus, nor are the distinguishing marks 
accounted true differentiae, but quasi-differentiae. 

These two necessary requisites of the genus 
and the differentia must be carefully borne in 
mind, as a right understanding of this thesis 
hinges on them. 

51. Being is not a genus: First proof. 

The first argument to establish our thesis, 
viz., that being is not a generic concept,, runs 
thus: Genus is understood to be a concept 
which is not contained in the differentiae, and 
hence is not predicable of them ; thus " animal " 
is a true genus in respect to " rational." For 



56 Being 

" animal " denotes an organized being endowed 
with sensation, whilst " rational " signifies that 
in man from which his faculty of understanding 
and reasoning proceeds ; now it is plain that the 
former concept is not involved in the latter ; and 
consequently, I am not allowed to say, " to be 
rational is to possess the faculty of feeling." 

But not so with " being " ; for it is essentially 
included in the concept of any entity, and hence 
also in the limiting modes, so that it may truly 
and really be predicated of, say, self-existence or 
creatureship ; for this reason, it cannot be re- 
garded as a " genus " in the technical sense of 
the word. Nor would it be proper to call the 
modes of being " differentiae," without any 
qualification, since it is agreed that a differentia 
must not include that which it determines. They 
may be called quasi-differentiae or differentiae in 
a loose sense. 

52. Being is not a genus: Second proof. 
Let us now pass on to our other proof; this 
considers the differentiae in reference to the 
genus, whereas the first viewed the genus rela- 
tively to the differentiae. It proceeds thus: As 
appears from what we said at the beginning of 
the thesis, the determinations of a true genus 
lie altogether outside of it and are therefore in 
no sense comprised within its contents. This 
will be best understood by recurring to the ex- 
ample given in the first argument. " Animal " 



Being Not a Genus 57 

is a genuine genus, since rationality in no way 
enters the notion of animality. But with " be- 
ing," the case is quite different. For there can 
be no determination whatever outside of being; 
because outside of being there is only nothing- 
ness, and nothing cannot be a determination. 
Hence the modes of being are enclosed within 
the content of being, at least as being, and 
therefore being is not a genus. 

It is plain that the argument just given, is a 
direct application of the previous thesis (thes. 
3), to the matter under consideration. The 
first proof we advanced also stands in intimate 
relation both to the second argument and to the 
preceding thesis. For being could not include 
its modes, if it were not essentially and explicitly 
predicable of them. We say this to show how 
closely these last discussions are linked together. 

53. Statement that being is not a genus, 
confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas. 
Let us corroborate our teaching in regard to the 
non-generic character of being by two passages 
from St. Thomas. He says (lib. 3. metaph. lect. 
8, parag. k.) : " Non enim genus ponitur in 
definitione differentiae, quia differentia non par- 
ticipat genus " ; that is to say : " The genus 
does not enter the definition of the differentia, 
because the differentia does not involve the 
genus." And again he writes (1 p. 3. a. 5.): 
" Ens non potest esse genus alicujus. Omne 



58 Being 

enim genus habet differentias quae sunt extra 
essentiam generis. Nulla autem differentia po- 
test inveniri, quae non sit ens, quia non ens non 
potest esse differentia." This passage might be 
rendered thus : " Being cannot be a genus in re- 
gard to anything comprised under it. For every 
genus has differentiae which are outside the es- 
sence expressed by the genus. Now there can 
be no differentia which is not being ; because non- 
being cannot be a differentia." 

54. Being not any of the five predicables. 
Being then is not a genus, nor is it any of the 
other four predicables, viz. species, differentia, 
property, and accident, as can be readily seen 
from an even superficial analysis of these no- 
tions. 

That it is not a differentia, has been already 
explained in the thesis. But let us briefly re- 
state the reason in a slightly different form. 
The differentia is a notion which distinguishes 
one thing from another ; hence, as all things agree 
in being, it cannot be a differentia. 

" Species " is a compound of genus and differ- 
entia; but we have just shown, being is neither 
the one nor the other. Further, being is a sim- 
ple concept, and hence it cannot be broken up 
into two or more. Being, then, has none of the 
characteristics of a species. 

Nor is it a " property " or an " accident." 
For both of these are something superadded to 



Being Not a Genus 59 

reality fully constituted, whereas being lies at 
the very root of everything, it is the most fun- 
damental of all the constituents of an entity. 
Moreover, an accident can come and go, and 
the thing of which it is an accident, remains. 
But not so with being; take away being, and 
you have nothing left. 



CHAPTER SIXTH 

Composition of Being With Its Modes 

ARTICLE i 

Composition of Being With Its Modes Not 
Metaphysical 

Summary: Inquiry outlined — Meaning of restricting 
the applicability of a concept — Metaphys- 
ical grades — General notion of composi- 
tion — Division of composition into meta- 
physical, physical, and logical — First 
proof of thesis — Preliminary remarks to 
second proof — Adequate and inadequate 
conception of a perfection — Second proof 

— An inference — An explanatory remark 

— A query answered — Third proof — 
Scholium. 

55. Inquiry outlined. There now arises a 
serious difficulty from all we have said, which 
demands an answer. It cannot be denied, on 
the one hand, that being may be determined or 
narrowed down to more concrete concepts, as, 
e. g. to substance and accident. But how is 
this possible if being has no differences, and if, 
moreover, it includes all being within itself? 
60 



Composition of Being With Its Modes 61 

We shall evolve what is to be held on this 
rather perplexing question in the next three 
theses. It is found more convenient to begin this 
discussion by showing that being is not deter- 
mined in the manner in which concepts are ordi- 
narily rendered definite. Hence the first thesis 
on this phase of our subject will be of a negative 
character. 

THESIS 5 

The concept of being is not restricted 
in its applicability, by adding to it 
another concept adequately distinct 
from it, or, in technical language, by 
" metaphysical composition." 

56. Meaning of restricting the applicability 
of a concept. Before proceeding to the proof 
of the thesis, we must explain the meaning of 
some of the terms used in it; and first of all, 
let us make clear what we want to convey when 
we speak of restricting, limiting, contracting, or 
narrowing down the^ applicability of a concept. 

We are said to restrict the applicability of a 
concept when we determine its content and re- 
duce its extent or scope of predication by the 
addition of some distinguishing mark. Thus, I 
restrict the notion " living being " by attaching 
" sensitive," and I limit the latter by joining 
" rational " to it : and, if I choose, I can still 



62 Being 

further narrow down the predicability of the 
compound notion " rational, sensitive, living be- 
ing " by the qualifying attributes " white," 
" learned/' and the like. Recall what we said 
on this matter when speaking of the extension 
of ideas (No. n). This method of reducing the 
breadth of a concept constitutes a sort of com- 
position or putting together of two concepts, and 
hence it has been called by metaphysicians the 
determination of a concept by " composition." 

Now there are several kinds of composition 
which we must consider a little more fully in 
order to clear up our notions. 

57. Metaphysical grades. But before do- 
ing so, we have to explain a point which enters 
into the proper understanding of " composition " 
in its present use, and will also frequently occur 
in our later discussions, namely the meaning of 
the phrase " metaphysical grades of being." 
These so-called metaphysical grades of being 
are nothing else than the different essential at- 
tributes, whether generic, specific, or individual, 
constituting a finite individual. Thus, this man 
Peter comprises the attributes rational, sensitive, 
living, corporeal, and substantial, together with 
the distinctive mark which makes him this par- 
ticular person and has been called by reputable 
writers " Petreity." These several perfections 
are called "grades" (gradus, steps), because 
they are, as it were, the rungs or rounds by the 



Composition of Being With Its Modes 63 

aid of which the mind ascends from the par- 
ticular to the universal when analyzing a concept. 
The example given a few lines back, will serve 
to illustrate our meaning. 

These grades are qualified as " metaphysical," 
because by means of them what is physically 
one, becomes metaphysically many, in as much 
as the mind projects into the object, distinctions 
which it contrives to create by its own innate 
power of abstraction, where there are none in 
external reality. This pluralizing of physically 
identical attributes, lying as it does, above and 
beyond the physical, belongs, therefore, to the 
metaphysical order. Now, these metaphysical 
grades are mutually exclusive, and on this ac- 
count, exist in the ideal or metaphysical order 
as entirely separate entities; in other words, 
any one of them prescinds altogether from the 
rest constituting the same individual. That such 
is the case, follows from the fact that any two 
of these grades are reciprocally deniable, as when 
I say, " to be material is not to be substantial " : 
nor can our right to do this be questioned; for 
the definitions of the various metaphysical grades 
of being are different; thus in the example just 
adduced, " substantiality " expresses independ- 
ence of a subject of inhesion, and " materiality " 
denotes multiplicity of parts. — These considera- 
tions are fully set forth in the treatise on 
" Unity," to which they properly belong. 



64 Being 

58. General notion of composition — Divi- 
sion of composition into metaphysical, physical 
and logical. Let us now return to the subject 
of " composition " and show its connection with 
the determination and restriction of concepts. 

Composition, in general, is the union of things 
which are distinct. It is divided into real, meta- 
physical and logical. It is real, if the parts put 
together are really distinct, as e. g. the stem, the 
leaves, the sepals and the petals of a violet. It 
is metaphysical, when the parts combined, though 
physically identical, are conceptually distinct, and 
that in such a way as to be mutually exclusive 
of one another; in other words, metaphysical 
composition is the union of metaphysical grades 
of being. 

The union of both physical and metaphysical 
parts is composition strictly so called. For, to 
have genuine composition, it is required that 
two realities be added which are not mutually 
inclusive; and this condition is fulfilled in the 
two kinds of composition, termed physical and 
metaphysical respectively. 

But there is still a third sort of composition, 
called logical, which, however, falls short of 
genuine composition and can lay claim to that 
name only by analogy. In it we also have two 
concepts which are put together, but these con- 
cepts are not distinct in the proper acceptation 
of the term. For they neither stand for two 



Composition of Being With Its Modes 65 

things, of which one is not the other independ- 
ently of the mind, nor for two objective notions 
completely prescinded from one another, and 
hence reciprocally exclusive. On the other 
hand, these notions are not altogether the same; 
for if they were, we could not have composition 
of any sort whatsoever. How then do they 
differ? In this way, that the one of the two 
concepts expresses distinctly, what the other 
contains, indeed, yet represents only indefinitely. 

Composition of this sort does not consist in 
making a concept definite by the addition of an- 
other altogether extrinsic to it, but in this, that 
the mind determines and evolves the contents of 
a notion by expressing or bringing out what is 
already latent in it, or in other words, by ren- 
dering explicit what before was in it merely im- 
plicitly. It might perhaps not be inaccurate to 
say, that what is added in this case, is definite- 
ness and precision. 

Let us now clear up the difference between 
metaphysical and logical composition by two com- 
parisons. We omit physical composition as ir- 
relevant to our present subject matter. Bear 
in mind, however, that all comparisons are lame 
and therefore always fall short in some respects. 
We shall begin with metaphysical composition. 
— Suppose you want to sketch the head of some 
one, say of Benjamin Franklin. At first, you 
draw merely the outlines of his face in broad 



66 Being 

touches, then you fill in, adding stroke to stroke 
until the features are all sharply and accurately 
traced. This picture of the inventor of the light- 
ning rod is thus obtained, as it were, by con- 
stant extraneous additions made to the original 
draught ; and hence this process might be likened 
to " metaphysical composition " of concepts, 
where the attribute joined is outside and distinct 
from the notion to which it is affixed, e. g. 
rational in respect to animal. 

But there is another way of rendering an ob- 
ject definite. — Suppose that on entering a draw- 
ing-room you notice a painting at its further 
end. You see, indeed, that it represents a hu- 
man being, but whether a man or a woman you 
cannot yet tell. Being curious to know who it 
is, you walk up closer. In your new position, 
you can make out that the painting is that of 
a man, in fact, you can already form some idea 
of the general outlines of his features; but all 
is still vague and indefinite. You advance still 
further, and now every lineament stands out 
plainly and distinctly. You find yourself con- 
fronted by a person with a countenance expres- 
sive of the highest intellectuality and beaming 
with benevolence. You recognize the face at 
once; it is that of Benjamin Franklin. 

Here we have something akin to what hap- 
pens in logical composition. As you approach 
nearer and nearer to the picture, nothing new 



Composition of Being With Its Modes 67 

is added to it. What you see now was there 
from the very outset, though at first it was 
perceived only in an indistinct manner. But 
with every step forward, what lay, as it were, 
hidden under the shadowy form, is brought out 
more and more, till at last the noble figure of 
the great American statesman reveals itself to 
you in all its details and minutiae. — The sketch 
of which we spoke in the first example, was given 
definiteness by filling in, so to speak; the pic- 
ture just alluded to, is rendered determinate by 
merely bringing into clearer view what was con- 
tained in it all along. 

59. The composition o£ being with its 
modes is not metaphysical: First argument. 
We are now ready to prove our thesis in which 
we state that being is not narrowed down to its 
primary divisions by " metaphysical composi- 
tion," that is, by the addition of a concept ade- 
quately prescinded from being and exclusive of 
it. What we are about to say, will, in fact, 
seem little else than a repetition of previous 
conclusions, and rightly so ; for the present 
thesis is only a corollary of principles laid down 
before. Let us take our first proof from a 
consideration of the modes of being in their 
relation to being in general. 

We proceed thus: In order to have what is 
called " metaphysical composition," we require 
two concepts which are mutually exclusive. 



68 Being 

Now, can we exclude being from its modes? 
No, this is impossible. For being is essentially 
predicable of all its modes, because " self-exist- 
ent/' " deriving existence from another," etc. 
are something, and therefore possess being. 
Hence it follows that being cannot be shut out 
from its modes. 

We can show this also from the absurd con- 
sequences implied in the assumption that the 
mind can take being from its determining modes. 
Let us make the attempt to do so. What is a 
mode thus divested of being? Is it something 
or nothing? It cannot be maintained that it is 
nothing, since a mode is a determination, and 
" nothing " does not determine. If, on the other 
hand, we suppose that the mode is something, 
then it is being; and hence I am just where I 
was at the outset. I can repeat the operation, 
but with the same result always, no matter how 
often reiterated; and this is tantamount to say- 
ing that the separation of being from its modes 
cannot be effected. One might just as well un- 
dertake to fill a barrel without a bottom with 
water as to part being from its modes. 

60. Preliminary remarks to second proof 
of thesis: Adequate and inadequate concep- 
tion of a perfection. Let us now pass to an- 
other argument, based on the character of being 
as inclusive of its modes. But before beginning 
the proof, we must first call attention to a double 



Composition of Being With Its Modes 69 

way of regarding the concept being. For, as 
hinted at in the wording of the thesis, being can 
either be conceived adequately and perfectly, or 
else inadequately and imperfectly. — In general 
the conception of a perfection is said to be ade- 
quate when it expresses all that is required, in 
order that the perfection in question may exist 
in the real order. Thus, I conceive " man " ade- 
quately, when my mind represents all that his 
essential definition implies, namely, rational, sen- 
sitive, and organic life together with bodily sub- 
stance. For these constituent elements suffice in 
order that man may exist as man. But were I 
to conceive " man " merely as a sensitive or cor- 
poreal being, I would not apprehend him ade- 
quately, since more is required for man as man 
to exist apart from thought. To know " animal " 
perfectly, however, I need not think " ration- 
ality " or " irrationality." For these lie outside 
the concept of animal ; they are, indeed, required 
that animal may exist as man or brute, but not 
precisely as animal. Hence to conceive a per- 
fection fully, it is enough to think just those at- 
tributes which go to make up the particular 
grade of perfection under consideration, however 
low in the scale of being that may be. 

To apply what we have said to the case of 
being. The mind knows being adequately when 
it lays hold on all that without which being as 
being cannot exist in nature. Now it is plain 



jo Being 

that in order to conceive being as realizable apart 
from thought, we cannot set aside these modes, 
since they belong to the very essence of being 
as being. For being as found in God is intrin- 
sically different from that of creatures, because 
God is being, or opposed to nothing in quite a 
different sense from creatures. Creatures, true, 
are not a non-entity, yet they may become so ; 
God also is not a non-entity, but it is utterly 
impossible for him ever to be reduced to nothing- 
ness. — The same holds true, " mutatis mutan- 
dis," of being as constituting substance and ac- 
cident. 

Now, it is of the concept of being adequately 
viewed, or taken as to all it essentially implies, 
that we are speaking in the following proof, 
whilst in the first thesis, where we discussed the 
unity of being, we dealt with the inadequate con- 
cept of being, which omits or fails to represent 
something belonging to the very essence of be- 
ing, viz. its modes. This inadequate concept is 
also sometimes called the logical, and the ade- 
quate, the metaphysical concept of being. 

6 1. The composition of being with its 
modes is not metaphysical: Second argu- 
ment. We are now ready for the other proof 
of our thesis. In fact, we have already antici- 
pated it to some extent, as we could not well 
explain the above notions without doing so. Our 
argument runs thus : 



Composition of Being With Its Modes Ji 

If the composition of being with its modes 
were of the metaphysical sort, then being ade- 
quately considered would be entirely clear of its 
modes, and hence would be equally susceptible 
of any of the various differentiations which may 
be added to it: in other words, the very same 
identical being, which, when predicated of God, 
is joined to " self-existent," could, when affirmed 
of creatures, be coupled with " deriving existence 
from another." All this follows from the very 
definition of metaphysical composition as above 
given. Consequently, when I say, " God is be- 
ing," the concept of being as thus realized in 
God and exhaustively conceived as to all it in- 
cludes as being, would not involve self-existence ; 
and when I state, " Creatures are being," the 
idea of being as objectified in creatures and like- 
wise fully considered in regard to all that is in 
it, would not imply dependence on another. 
Now, either of these inferences is utterly un- 
tenable. For there is nothing in God which is 
not under every respect unconditioned and self- 
existent, and there can be nothing in the creature 
which is not wholly conditioned and dependent 
on God. For this reason, it is not correct to 
say that being as predicated of God is so com- 
pletely denuded of its determining modes as not 
to include them. Whence it follows that when 
I add " self-existent " to being as attributed to 
God, or join " dependent " to being as affirmed 



72 Being 

of creatures, I really do not affix a new note, but 
I merely evolve and draw out what was in being 
already. 

What we have said of being as predicated of 
God and creatures, holds true, of course, also 
of being in reference to substance and accident, 
since the very being of substance is independent 
of a subject in which to inhere, whilst the very 
being of accident is opposed to nothing in abso- 
lute dependence on a subject of inhesion. 

62. An inference. From the above, we can 
readily see how the assertion that being is de- 
termined by metaphysical composition would 
lead to a pantheistical conception of God and 
the world, since the being in both would be of 
entirely the same nature; and to suppose this is 
a form of pantheism. 

Since then the modes cannot be taken from 
being altogether, neither is it strictly accurate 
to say that they are added to it. Such an ex- 
pression is allowable only in a restricted sense. 
The addition in this case is merely logical, that 
is, conceived as such by the mind. 

63. An explanatory remark. Our last ar- 
gument also assigns a new reason why being is 
not a genus. We proved in thesis 4, that being 
has no title to this name, because it contains its 
own differences as being, and now we have 
proven that the objective concept of being as ap- 
plied to its primary divisions moreover includes 



Composition of Being With Its Modes 73 

its distinguishing modes as such, though, of 
course, it never expresses them as such, even 
obscurely. (The difference between a concept 
including something and expressing the same, 
was given No. 47.) In technical language, being 
involves its modes " virtually " but not " form- 
ally " or " explicitly." 

64. A query answered. But some one 
might say, cannot all this be said of any generic 
concept as well, e. g. of animal as predicated 
of brute and man? Is not the animality as 
found in man wholly rational, and as inherent in 
brute entirely irrational? and might we not say 
that if animality as predicated of man does not 
contain rationality, there would be something in 
man which is not wholly and entirely rational? 
Our answer is, that there is something in man 
which is not wholly rational, in fact, not rational 
at all. True, in the physical order, animality 
and rationality are identified in man; yet these 
two perfections are of such a nature that each 
can be fully or adequately conceived without the 
other ; and hence v in the metaphysical order, 
neither includes the other, whereas being in God 
and self-existent, involve each other even in the 
metaphysical order. 

65. The composition of being with its 
modes is not metaphysical: Third argument. 
To clear up this abstruse subject a little more,, 
we shall give a third proof, which, however, is 



74 Being 

a mere modification of the previous one, based 
on the relation of the differentia to the genus. 

First note, that if being were compounded 
with its defining modes by metaphysical compo- 
sition, then, by definition, being and any of its 
modes would constitute two so-called metaphys- 
ical grades (No. 57), and hence stand to each 
other in the relation of genus and differentia. 
For when we have two metaphysical grades, of 
which one determines the other, the determining 
grade is called differentia, whilst the determined 
is named genus. Now, it is admitted on all 
hands that the differentia, to be truly such, must 
add something distinct to the genus, something in 
no way included in the generic concept. If being 
then is a genus, " self-existent " v. g. should be 
something lying altogether outside its concept. 

To find out whether such is the case, let us 
ascertain what being as a genus in the proper 
sense of the word would denote. We assert 
that it would signify simply being, nothing but 
being, being unrestricted, being without any ad- 
mixture of non-being. For since being is now 
supposed to be a truly generic concept, all de- 
terminations, restrictions, and limitations would 
be shut out from it, and therefore it would ex- 
press only being to the elimination of all non- 
being, just as animal sets forth that which con- 
stitutes an animal, to the exclusion of all non- 
animality. Now, being of this sort is, of course, 



Composition of Being With Its Modes 75 

" self-existent " being. This is the philosophical 
reason why God said to Moses, that his name was 
Javeh, 6 &v, that is, very being itself, independent 
and underived. Hence it follows that, if being 
were a genus, it must include " self-existent " 
(a se), and consequently, this latter cannot be 
regarded as a differentia, since this always 
makes some real addition to the genus. From 
this, then, we infer that " being " and " self-ex- 
istent " cannot stand to each other in the relation 
of genus to differentia. 

But granting that " self-existent " (a se) is 
not a true differentia of being, may not perhaps 
"deriving existence from another" (ab alio) 
be considered as such? No, it cannot, and that 
even less than " self-existent." For since be- 
ing, if a genus, would mean " self-existent be- 
ing " (as just proven), "derived being," on the 
same supposition, would mean " self-existent, de- 
rived being," a senseless medley of ideas. 

This same process of reasoning can be readily 
adapted to "being existing by itself" (ens per 
se), and "being existing in another as in a sub- 
ject of inhesion" (ens in alio). 

The relation of being to its modes is, there- 
fore, not that of genus to differentia ; but being 
together with any of its four primary determina- 
tions constitutes but one complete concept, which 
can be also represented by two incomplete con- 
cepts. Thus substance is one complete concept, 



j6 Being 

a true metaphysical grade of being, a genuine 
genus ; and this one concept can also be con- 
ceived by means of two partial concepts, " be- 
ing " and " existing by itself," the former ex- 
pressing substance according to its common char- 
acter, and, as it were, as a concrete subject, and 
the latter representing the same as to the dis- 
criminating element which determines the com- 
mon subject. 

66. Scholium. In our last proof we have 
shown that being is not a genus because it in- 
cludes its modes as modes in the manner ex- 
plained; in the third thesis we pointed out that 
it has no claim to the name of genus, because 
it comprises its modes as being. These two 
statements are very closely connected: in fact, 
as a little reflection will show, the reason why 
being includes the modes also as modes is, be- 
cause it contains them as being: for it follows 
from this, that being is of the very essence of the 
modes; and hence, just as being is inseparable 
from the modes, so are they from it. 

ARTICLE 2 

The Composition of Being with Its Modes 
Logical 

Summary: Subject of inquiry stated — Thesis: Com- 
position of being with its modes logical — 
Two proofs of thesis — Manner in which 
modes of being are evolved out of being. 



Composition of Being With Its Modes JJ 

67. Subject of inquiry stated. We now 

pass to the positive part of this phase of our 
investigation, in which we shall show, how be- 
ing, in matter of fact, is determined and nar- 
rowed down to its supreme subordinate mem- 
bers. Let us compress our teaching on this 
point into the following thesis : 



THESIS 6 

Being is determined and narrowed 
down to its four supreme divisions, 
by what is known as " logical com- 
position," that is to say, by a more 
definite conception o£ the vaguer 
reality being. 

The meaning of our thesis in other words is 
this : Being is not restricted in its applicability 
by adding something extrinsic to it, something 
from which it fully prescinds and which is fully 
prescinded from it; but it is thus restricted by 
bringing out what the concept of being contains 
indeed, but does net express. 

68. Two arguments to show that the com- 
position of being with its modes is logical. 
We shall proceed at once to our arguments; for 
they follow immediately and readily from our 
previous thesis. 

Let us begin with an argument from exclu- 



Jo Being 

sion : Composition, as is universally acknowl- 
edged, is either physical, metaphysical or logical. 
Now as regards being and its modes, it is not 
physical (thes. 3), nor metaphysical (thes. 4). 
Hence it must be logical. Thus we have proved 
our contention with little labor. Let it be noted, 
however, that such arguments as this, though 
perfectly convincing, yet are not very luminous, 
as they show only that an assertion is so, with- 
out at the time assigning the reason why it is 
so. 

Let us then add another, more direct demon- 
stration, that will tell us something of the 
grounds for our thesis. It runs thus : 

Composition is logical, when two concepts are 
put together which, on the one hand, are not 
exclusive of one another, and, on the other, are 
not altogether the same. That these two condi- 
tions are required is plain; for where mutually 
exclusive concepts are joined together, the com- 
position is metaphysical: and where there is no 
distinction at all between the notions brought 
into conjunction, there is no composition of any 
sort. For nothing is compounded with itself: 
thus it would be ridiculous to say, " a stone is 
a bodily body." That the two requirements are 
fulfilled in the case of being, admits of no doubt. 
For the modes of being include being, and being 
includes them. On the other hand, being in 
general differs from its modes; for, although it 



Composition of Being With Its Modes 79 

includes them, yet it does not express them as 
such : and the modes differ from mere being, 
for they are being in general rendered definite 
and precise. — Now we can understand why " the 
logical composition " of being is said to consist 
in the fuller expression and evolution of being; 
for the four primary modes are really nothing 
else than the being to which they are added, but 
without its indefiniteness and vagueness : they 
are, as it were, being lighted up from within 
and thus rendered determinate and distinct. 
Being, then, is determined by what is called 
logical composition. 

69. Manner in which the modes of being 
are evolved out of being. But some one 
might ask, how is it possible to evolve the above 
named modes out of being? Suggest the con- 
cept of being to some one, and then leave him 
to himself; do you think that by the closest 
scrutiny and analysis of that notion, he could 
develop the four primary modes from it? 

To understand this the better, recall what was 
said before that a concept may include a given 
perfection in two Ways. Sometimes it actually 
expresses the entity under consideration, and 
thus contains it explicitly, as, for example, the 
concept " man " in relation to its essential con- 
stituents, bodily substance, life, sensation, and 
intellect. Now, in this case, mere analysis of 
the preceding notion suffices without going out- 



80 Being 

side of it, to discover any of the notes com- 
prised within the compass of its meaning. Look 
attentively at the notion " man," and you will 
perceive in it, substance, body, life, sensation 
and reason; these, then, are involved explicitly 
or " formally " in the concept " man," in as far 
as this latter expresses them, each according to 
its own peculiar form and character. 

But there is still another way in which a con- 
cept may comprise a perfection; not, indeed, 
as before, by expressing it, but as including it 
virtually or as containing it under its extension. 
In this case, the implied attribute cannot be 
drawn out of the containing concept by a merely 
analytical process; but in order to perceive the 
involved perfection, I need outside information, 
gotten independently of the concept which I am 
contemplating; and thus, and thus only, can I 
come to a knowledge of the modes as included 
in being. Inclusion of this sort is called " vir- 
tual " in opposition to " formal," because the 
containing concept possesses the virtue or 
power, as it were, of expanding and unfolding 
itself into what it bears within. The case is 
very similar to what we meet with in the syl- 
logism or reasoning process. For the antecedent 
may contain the conclusion either " virtually " or 
" formally." The latter happens whenever we 
can arrive at a knowledge of the consequent by 
mere analysis of the antecedent. Thus when I 



Composition of Being With Its Modes 81 

say, " man is an animal," by merely searching 
into the notion " animal," I can at once infer 
that man is a living being or a substance. But 
it often happens that no amount of analysis of 
the antecedent will enable you to deduce a cer- 
tain conclusion. To do so, you require infor- 
mation, not to be gotten from the consideration 
of the major premise alone. Take the assertion, 
" All men are mortal " ; no matter, how closely 
you examine this proposition, you will never 
learn from it that Togo is mortal, unless you first 
ascertain from other sources that Togo is a man. 
This knowledge is furnished by the minor of 
the syllogism. 

But perhaps some one wants to know how 
the modes of being are evolved out of being 
with the aid of outside information. This is 
amply explained in " Natural Theology," as re- 
gards God and creatures, and in another part of 
Ontology in respect to substance and accident. 
It might not be out of place, however, briefly 
to indicate the lines on which this is done. Thus 
I can find out the two modes of being — " con- 
ditioned " (ab alio) and "unconditioned" (a 
se), by noting how all visible things are im- 
perfect, subject to change and hence conditioned, 
and then rising from their existence to that of 
a first, absolute cause, God. And I form the 
concepts " existent in itself " (per se) and " ex- 
isting in a subject of inhesion" (in alio), by 



82 Being 

observing the objects round about me and no- 
ticing that there is something which is permanent 
(per se) and something which is changeable (in 
alio) in them. The permanent (e. g. a lump 
of wax) I call substance and the changeable 
(e. g. its divers forms) I name accident. 

In order to hold what we have said more 
firmly, it might be useful to illustrate this 
abstruse matter by a concrete example. The 
particular points on which we wish to shed a 
little additional light by our comparison are these : 
how it is possible for being to be one as to what 
it represents, and yet manifold as to what it 
contains, and, how the manifold of its content 
can be evolved by a more distinct apprehension 
of the vaguer concept " being." 

Suppose I take a piece of chalk, reduce it to 
powder and form it into a tiny heap. Along- 
side of it, I place three other little piles, one of 
salt, a second of flour, and a third of sugar. 
Let us assume further that the four, small 
mounds agree perfectly in appearance as far as 
the eye is concerned, though, of course, they 
are very different in substance. Now, in regard 
to these four masses, I might truly say that, 
as represented by the eye, they are the same, 
yet as to what they contain, they are very differ- 
ent. Further, to ascertain the diversity in mate- 
rial, I need data not furnished by sight alone. 



Composition of Being With Its Modes 83 

I must have recourse to the taste, chemical tests, 
and the like. 

Thus, in a similar manner, " being," as predi- 
cated of God, creatures, substance, and accident, 
presents itself under the same guise to the in- 
tellect, yet what it includes in each case is 
wholly different ; and to apprehend this diversity, 
I must go beyond the concept of mere abstract 
being for further knowledge. 

The reason why we insist so much on the 
proper understanding of the preceding matter 
is, that the right explanation of the analogous- 
ness of being, one of the most important doc- 
trines in philosophy, hinges, to a very great ex- 
tent, on the acceptance of the doctrine expressed 
in the last thesis. 



CHAPTER 7 
Unity of Being Imperfect 

Summary: Subject of inquiry outlined — Thesis: 
Unity of being imperfect — Proof of 
thesis — A question answered — Resem- 
blance of creatures to God imperfect — 
Points of difference between Infinite be- 
ing and being in general. 

70. Subject of inquiry outlined. There 
still remains one more point, which we must 
clear up before we pass to the analogousness 
of being; it regards the kind of logical unity 
possessed by being. The solution of this ques- 
tion will at once supplement and round off what 
has gone before and help to elucidate what is 
to follow. Let us cast our views on the matter 
under discussion into the following thesis : 

THESIS 7 

The general concept of being, al- 
though possessed of true unity, is 
not one in the fullest sense of the 
term. 

71. Proof of thesis. The unity which we 
claim for being is, of course, logical. Now 

84 



Unity of Being Imperfect 85 

logical unity consists in this, that one concept 
represents the common essence of several things. 
It is perfect when the several things agree in 
the common essence without any difference in 
that essence; if such is not the case, it is im- 
perfect. Thus, " animal " is a notion possessing 
perfect unity ; for man and brute beast resemble 
each other in animality, and are in no wise dis- 
tinguished by it. But this cannot be said of 
being in regard to its four primary divisions. 
For we have shown that they are at once like 
and unlike each other in being, since the very 
being of substance, for example, is other than 
that of accident. Hence the unity of being can- 
not be called perfect. 

We can show this also from the notion of 
transcendental unity. 

" The one " in its broadest meaning is defined 
as that which is undivided in itself and divided 
from all else. Now neither the first nor the 
second part of this description of the one is 
fully verified in the concept of being. Not the 
first; for a notion is undivided in itself when 
it represents only" that in which several things 
agree and shuts out that by which they are dis- 
criminated. Thus, to recur to our typical exam- 
ple, animality is endowed with logical unity in 
the fullest sense of the word, because it is the 
common element of man and brute to the ex- 
clusion of everything that holds the two apart. 



86 Being 

The differences " rational " and " irrational " are 
entirely extrinsic to animal. But not so with 
being. It contains its modes within itself as 
being, and it, moreover, includes them in so 
far as they are identified with it, not only in 
the physical, but also in the metaphysical order. 
Hence, being does not fulfil the first condition 
required for perfect unity. 

Here a difficulty suggests itself. How is it 
possible for being to include or to be identified 
with the four modes, considering that they are 
exclusive of one another. To meet this objec- 
tion, note that being may be regarded in two 
ways, either as unapplied, or as applied to its 
respective subjects of predication, viz. God, 
creatures, substance, and accident. If viewed as 
unapplied, it contains the modes, not conjointly, 
indeed, but, as it were, indefinitely and dis- 
junctively, in so far as being is either self-exist- 
ent or dependent, existing in itself or in another. 
But if being is considered as applied to the de- 
terminate subjects above named, then it neces- 
sarily includes some one particular, definite 
mode, without, however, representing it. Thus 
when I say, " God is being," the predicate com- 
prises self-existent, because self-existence is of 
the very essence of being as referred to God, and 
so for the rest. 

As regards the other part of the definition of 
unity, which demands that the one be divided 



Unity of Being Imperfect 87 

from all else, it is not strictly verified in the 
case of being either. For being is essentially 
contained in its modes, since it is impossible to 
conceive a mode without conceiving it as some- 
thing, as being. 

Hence being cannot be one in the best sense 
of oneness ; it is so only in so far as it does 
not set forth the modes, and it does not set 
them forth, merely because the mind does not 
represent them. There is no separation be- 
tween being and its modes on the part of the 
object expressed. The separation is purely log- 
ical, not metaphysical ; in other words, being 
prescinds from its modes inadequately only. 

72. A question answered. In connection 
with the unity of being it might be asked, is it 
correct to say that being contains the modes in 
its comprehension f — We answer with a distinc- 
tion. You may say that being includes the 
modes as being in its comprehension, but not 
as such definitely taken. For what forms part 
of the comprehension of a concept, must be in 
some way represented by it; now, as we have 
said over and over again, being represents the 
modes as being, but not in any other manner. 

73. Resemblance of creatures to God im- 
perfect. This last thesis also gives a reason 
why creatures are similar to God only imper- 
fectly. For in order that two (or more) things 
may resemble each other perfectly, it is neces- 



88 Being 

sary that we should be able to conceive them 
by means of one concept, which cuts oft* their 
differentiating marks fully; that is, by a concept 
in which the things held to be similar do not 
at once agree and differ. Now as we have 
shown repeatedly, being is not a concept of this 
sort. But more about this in connection with 
the analogy of being. 

74. Points of difference between infinite 
being and being in general. Before we leave 
this aspect of our subject and proceed to con- 
sider the analogousness of being, let us add a 
remark or two by way of scholia to complete 
our doctrine. 

The concept of being, by reason of its uni- 
versality and owing to the fact that it is essen- 
tial to all reality, has been actually mistaken 
by some for God himself, who is essential to all 
things. Thus a misunderstanding of the doc- 
trine of being is at the root of Monism, a false 
philosophical system, which refers all phenomena 
to one common underlying principle. It is sur- 
prising how the ambiguity of words can lead 
to such vital errors. For it would be hard to 
ascribe the confounding of concepts so radically 
different and so faintly resembling one another 
to anything else than mere quibbling. True, 
both God and being in general possess an all- 
embracing universality, but in senses altogether 
different. God is the pattern, the efficient and 



Unity of Being Imperfect 89 

final cause and the preserver of all things con- 
tingent; being in the abstract is predicable of all 
things. God is external to all but himself; be- 
ing, on the other hand, is intrinsic to all reality. 
God does not constitute what he made; being is 
the very essence of that to which it is attributed. 
Being as such, then, expresses less than any other 
concept; for its content is but one single note; 
and for this reason it is predicable of every- 
thing. The idea of God, on the contrary, is the 
most comprehensive of ail. It embraces unlim- 
ited perfections, and on this account is referable 
to none but the Infinite God. 

Let us add one more remark pointing in the 
same direction. By a strange freak of language, 
it has come about that both being in general 
and God are said to be " simply " being. Being 
in general is so named by reason of its indehnite- 
ness and vagueness, as expressive of nothing ex- 
cept that in which all things agree. Hence, it 
is called " simply " being negatively, as denying 
all determination. God, on the other hand, is 
called " simply " being, because he is limited to 
no form of being, but possesses all being in an 
supereminent degree. This appellation then is 
given him in a positive sense, not as abstracting 
or prescinding from all definite perfections, but 
as including them all in his own unspeakable 
way. 



CHAPTER EIGHTH 

Analogousness of Being 

ARTICLE I 

Notion of Analogy 

Summary: Problem stated — Univocal terms — 
Equivocal terms — Analogous terms — 
Univocal, equivocal, and analogous concepts 
— Analogues — General division of anal- 
ogy — Analogy of attribution — Extrinsic 
and intrinsic analogy of attribution — 
Analogy of proportion — Extrinsic and 
intrinsic analogy of proportion — Meta- 
physical and physical analogy — Metaphys- 
ical, physical, and logical univocation. 

75. Problem stated. We now come to the 
last part in our study of being, namely its 
analogousness. Is being a univocal or analogous 
concept? This is a much debated question; it 
has been, and still is, the battleground of many 
a philosophical discussion. True, the general 
trend of opinion, at least nowadays, is, it 
would seem, to consider being as an analogous 
notion ; yet as regards the manner of explaining 
and defending this abstruse point, philosophers 
90 



Analogousness of Being 91 

are far from being unanimous; and this diver- 
gence of opinion often proves very confusing 
and troublesome. It shall be our endeavour, to 
remove some of the stumbling blocks obstructing 
the path of the sincere inquirer, both because 
this subject is of deepest interest in itself and 
because the solution of this problem one way 
or another is thought to have very far reaching 
bearings on many other vital doctrines. Thus 
Father Liberatore S. J., a man of no mean fame 
in matters philosophical, writes in his treatise 
" On Universals " : " This point is of no little 
moment, because the admission, that with respect 
to God and creatures, Being is univocal, ulti- 
mately leads to pantheism." 

The satisfactory settlement of the topic under 
discussion depends almost entirely on the con- 
clusions established in the previous part, as well 
as on the correct and precise definitions of the 
notions on which this perplexing question chiefly 
turns. In fact, it would seem that many of the 
heated controversies in regard to the analogy of 
being, are mere wars of words. 

Let us then first of all, clearly and sharply 
determine the meaning of such terms as have 
been the bone of contention in the past. The 
concept that claims our chief attention is, of 
course, that of analogy; but we must, at the 
same time, define the notions of the terms " uni- 
vocal " and " equivocal " on account of their 



92 Being 

close connection with the former. The exposi- 
tion of these three notions, expressing as they 
do certain peculiarities of both ideas and terms, 
by right, belongs to Dialectics; the requirements 
of our disquisition, however, render a somewhat 
exhaustive development of these concepts abso- 
lutely indispensable in this place. 

76. Univocal terms. A univocal term is 
one which signifies an essence common to several 
objects and predicable of all of them in exactly 
the same way. Terms of this sort are the same 
not only in sound, but also in sense. Thus 
" animal " is a univocal term in reference to men 
and brute beasts ; hence if I say, " An Indian is 
an animal," " A lion is an animal," " A sparrow 
is an animal," etc., " animal " invariably " means 
the same thing," viz. a living, sensitive being, 
and it is predicable of all its subjects of predica- 
tion in the same way, namely as essentially de- 
pendent on the Creator and independent of a 
subject of inhesion. So, in like manner, " vir- 
tue " as applied to prudence, justice, fortitude, 
and temperance, stands, in each case, for the 
same identical perfection, to wit, moral excel- 
lence. 

77. Equivocal terms. Equivocal terms, on 
the other hand, are those which are affirmed of 
their various subjects in entirely different mean- 
ings. Thus, the noun " mass " as referred to a 
quantity of matter and to a religious service- is 



Analogousness of Being 93 

such a term ; also the word " light " in the fol- 
lowing propositions : " A feather is light," and 
" God said : Be light made." It will be hardly 
necessary to call attention to the fact that all 
puns and plays of words are due to this pe- 
culiarity of terms. 

That the same word should signify things en- 
tirely different, is a mere coincidence. For 
either as a result of mere chance, or, perhaps 
of the laws regulating the alterations and per- 
mutations of vowels and consonants, it may 
happen that two words, resembling each other 
somewhat in their general make-up, give rise to 
derived forms which are identical in sound. 
Thus, to take the two instances used before, 
" mass," a quantity of matter, comes from 
" massa," (a lump) and " mass," a religious 
service, from " missa," (dismissal), whilst 
" light " in the sense of " not heavy " owes its 
origin to the German " leicht," and " light " 
meaning " energy making objects visible," is 
traceable to another word of that language, 
namely " Licht." v 

Equivocal terms are frequently called " homo- 
nyms," and that very appropriately. For a ho- 
monym (from 6fi6s, the same, and owfia, name), 
is understood to be a word which is one in 
name, but manifold in meaning; in fact, taking 
it all in all, " homonymy " would seem to be 
preferable to " equivocation " in the scientific 



94 Being 

meaning in which we take it here, as this latter 
term generally signifies the use of expressions 
susceptible of a double meaning with a purpose 
to mislead. For the same reason, the word 
" equivocalness," which is acknowledged by lexi- 
cographers as perfectly legitimate, would per- 
haps be more suitable in a logical and meta- 
physical treatise than equivocation. 

78. Analogous terms. Analogous terms hold 
a middle place between the univocal and equivo- 
cal ; for they are those which, when affirmed of 
their various subjects of predication, express no- 
tions (or objects) that are partly the same and 
partly different. Such is the term " gloomy," as 
referred to a man's looks and the weather. The 
same name is applied to the two, either because 
a gloomy countenance bears some sort of re- 
semblance to gloomy weather, or because a 
gloomy facial expression can often be traced to 
the gloomy condition of the air. It will be 
readily seen that the notions expressed by the 
common term, although somewhat similar and 
connected, are, at the same time, very dissimilar, 
that is, they are partly the same and partly dif- 
ferent. 

79. Univocal, equivocal, and analogous con- 
cepts. From terms, the epithets univocal, ho- 
monymous (equivocal), and analogous have been 
transferred to the (objective) concepts signified. 

Hence univocal concepts are those which are 



Analogousness of Being 95 

identical in every way, that is, both as to what 
they signify, and as to the manner in which 
they are referred to their respective subjects; 
whilst analogous notions, expressing as they do, 
things which are partly the same and partly dif- 
ferent, are not strictly identical, but only similar. 

There are, properly speaking, no homonymous 
concepts, homonymy (or equivocalness) being 
exclusively a property of terms. For, a concept 
being a natural, and not, like a term, a conven- 
tional sign, cannot possibly express more than 
one object (or one group of objects). How- 
ever, if you so choose, you may call homony- 
mous concepts those which are signified by ho- 
monymous terms, thus transferring, by a trope, 
what is characteristic of the sign (the term) to 
the concept signified. The Scholastics say that 
concepts are styled homonymous by an " extrin- 
sic denomination," that is, by reason of some- 
thing extrinsic to them (namely the common 
homonymous term). 

From what we have just said, we can readily 
infer that univocalness, homonymy, and analogy 
necessarily imply reference to several subjects 
of predication, and that the question whether 
a given term is univocal, homonymous, or anal- 
ogous, cannot be answered, until at least two 
objects, to which it can be ascribed, have been 
mentioned. Thus, if you ask me under which 
of these three classes of terms the word " bark " 



96 Being 

falis, I cannot satisfy you, unless you first name 
some of the things to which it is attributed. For 
it can be any of the three according to the 
divers subjects of predication. It is univocal, if 
applied to the outer covering, say, of a poplar 
and a sycamore, or to the cry uttered by a 
mastiff and a terrier at the approach of a 
stranger; it is homonymous (equivocal) when 
referred to the rind of a tree and the peculiar 
sound made by an angry dog; it is analogous 
when predicated of a small boat and the ex- 
terior envelope of a tree, or of reproachful, 
scolding language and the short, explosive noise 
made by one of the canine species. 

80. Analogues. Before we pass on to the 
various divisions of analogy, we must explain 
the signification of yet another expression which 
we shall have frequent occasion of using, namely 
that of " analogues." By " analogues " (or 
analoga) we mean the subjects of which anal- 
ogous terms (or concepts) are predicable. For 
example, when we speak of the countenance and 
the weather as gloomy, of love and fire as burn- 
ing, of the eye and the intellect as seeing, of 
God and creatures as beings, then countenance 
and weather, love and fire, eye and intellect, God 
and creatures, are the " analogues " of their re- 
spective predicates, gloomy, burning, seeing, and 
being. Analogue, taken in this restricted sense, 
is the exact equivalent of the Latin " analoga- 



Analog ousness of Being gy 

turn," out of which Father Harper S. J. makes 
" analogate " "; however, this word has not as yet 
found its way into any English dictionary. 

These analogues, or objects to which the anal- 
ogous terms are applied, are distinguished into 
principal (primary) and secondary; the princi- 
pal being those to which the common, analogous 
name is applied in its proper and original mean- 
ing; and the secondary, those to which the same 
term has been merely transferred on account of 
some connection of theirs with the principal. 

81. General division of analogy. We now 
come to the various kinds of analogy on which 
we must dwell at greater length, as having a 
special bearing on the subject under considera- 
tion. 

Analogy, then, in general, as here understood, 
is a term's capability of being applied to two 
or more objects with a meaning which is partly 
the same and partly different. 

It is divided into two classes, called analogy 
of attribution and analogy of proportion, accord- 
ing as the ground for attributing the same name 
to several things is either a simple relation of 
one thing to another, or else a resemblance of 
relations. 

82. Analogy of attribution. Analogy is of 
attribution when the essence signified by the 
analogous term is found in one of the analogues 
(namely the principal), primarily, first in order, 



98 Being 

and in its fulness, whilst in the others (the 
secondary), it is found only, in as far as they 
bear some sort of relation to the principal. To 
illustrate, the words " health " and " healthy " 
are applied to many objects widely different from 
each other. Thus we call men healthy, as when 
we say that Robert is in good health or has been 
restored to health. We also speak of healthy 
recreation, of healthy employment, of healthy 
exercise, of a healthy climate, of a healthy com- 
plexion, of a healthy pulse, of healthy sleep, and 
the like. We all know that " health " is predi- 
cated primarily and properly of animals alone; 
for health is the sound condition of a sensitive 
organism. It is attributed to other things only 
because connected in some way or other with a 
sound, sensitive organism. Thus recreation, 
employment, exercise, and climate are named 
healthy as conducive to health — complexion, the 
pulse, and sleep, as indicative of it. 

83. Extrinsic and intrinsic analogy of at- 
tribution. Analogy of attribution is again sub- 
divided into extrinsic and intrinsic. It is ex- 
trinsic when the essence expressed by the com- 
mon term is intrinsic to one only of the analogues 
(the principal) and extrinsic to the others (the 
secondary), to which it is attributed on account 
of some relation they have to the primary ana- 
logue. This happens, e. g. in case of the notion 
" healthy " just given. " Healthy " is an in- 



Analogousness of Being 99 

herent quality of none but animals ; other things 
may be conducive to health or tokens of it; they 
bear an extrinsic relation to the health of an 
animal; and thus come to appropriate the name 
" healthy " to themselves. 

It would seem from the preceding that what 
philosophers call analogy of extrinsic attribution, 
rhetoricians style metonymy or synecdoche. For 
these two figures of speech are founded on one 
or the other of the relations obtaining between 
cause and effect, sign and thing signified, con- 
tainer and contained, material and thing made 
of it, and the like. 

We now pass to the other subdivision of anal- 
ogy of attribution, namely the intrinsic. In this, 
what is signified by the common term (e. g. 
wise), is intrinsic to all the analogues (and not 
to the principal only) ; but the manner in which 
it exists in each of them is essentially differ- 
ent; for in one of them (the principal), it is 
found independent, unconditioned and in its 
fulness, whilst in the others (the secondary), 
it is dependent, conditioned, and in an essentially 
less perfect state. Thus the property expressed 
by the term " wise," truly belongs to both God 
and man, with this vast difference, however, 
that the wisdom of the creature is limited and 
dependent on that of the Creator, who possesses 
it without restriction or in an infinite degree. 

It is now easy to assign a reason why the 



ioo Being 

word " attribution " is used to describe this kind 
of analogy. For the original meaning of the 
verb " to attribute " is " to join in addition," " to 
add by way of increase." Since, then, in our 
case, a term (e. g. healthy), attributable pri- 
marily and properly to objects of a certain defi- 
nite class (e. g. to animals), has been trans- 
ferred and, as it were, " joined in addition " to 
others of a very different character (e. g. to 
medicine or complexion), hence it is that the 
analogy in question is said to be of " attribu- 
tion." But another way of accounting for the 
choice of the above denomination suggests itself 
to us. The phrase " analogy of attribution " was 
probably first used to describe " extrinsic " anal- 
ogy, since in this, a certain quality (e. g. 
healthy), truly and properly inherent in one 
thing, is merely ascribed or attributed to others 
in which it is not thus inherent. Both the above 
explanations, however, come practically to the 
same. As regards the combination of words, 
" analogy of attribution " we wish to remark, 
that it is not acknowledged by any of our stand- 
ard dictionaries, although it is used by several 
distinguished English writers on philosophy. As 
the relation between the primary and secondary 
analoga is generally causal, we might perhaps 
be allowed to substitute " causal or causative 
analogy " for analogy of attribution. Such 
modes of speech are at once more suggestive 



Analog onsness of Being 101 

and intelligible, and hence of a less pedantic 
character. 

84. Analogy of proportion. We now come 
to the last kind of analogy, namely that of 
" proportion." 

Analogy is so named when a term is at- 
tributed to something in a meaning different 
from its primary or proper one, and that by 
reason of a certain resemblance of relations. 
This sort of analogy, then, is based on the re- 
semblance or agreement of relations; and it is 
for this reason that it is called analogy of propor- 
tion; for proportion consists in an equality of 
ratios, or, in a wider sense, in any similarity 
of relations. The similarity in the present ease, 
however, is not perfect. 

But let us make our definition clearer by an 
example. We have all heard a brave warrior, 
e. g. Judas Machabeus, called a lion in bat- 
tle. " Lion " is here an analogous term of the 
kind we are just now discussing. In its proper 
signification it is applied to a well known ani- 
mal. But why is it also referred to Judas 
Machabeus, a man? On account of an agree- 
ment or resemblance of relations. For a brave 
warrior bears himself towards his foes in battle 
in a manner similar to that of a lion in his 
attack on other brute beasts. " Brave warrior " 
and " lion/' then, stand in certain relations to 
" foes in battle " and " brute beasts " respec- 



102 Being 

tively; and these relations are similar to a cer- 
tain extent. For the behavior of both when 
defending themselves or attacking, is character- 
ized by boldness, fierceness, and rage. However, 
the resemblance of the conduct of a warrior 
and a lion in their conflicts is by no means 
perfect. For the wrath of the self-sacrificing 
defender of his country is calculating; it is 
guided by reason and proceeds from self-devo- 
tion: it is a virtue in him; it is heroism. The 
ferocious onrush of the maddened beast is blind ; 
it is the result of unreasoning instinct; it is the 
outcome of mere brutish passion. 

Sometimes the comparison of the first mem- 
bers of the relations involved in the analogy 
is made with one object only; not, however, 
just as one, but as doing service for two; and 
hence this case is included in the former. Such 
would seem to be the case in the following cita- 
tion from the " Merchant of Venice " ; " How 
sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank," that 
is, just as the sight of one stretched on his couch 
in deep, healthy sleep, gives rise to a sense of 
peace and repose in a looker-on, so also does the 
view of the moonlight peacefully shining on a 
grassy bank. Here the tranquil sleeper and the 
moonlight may be both considered as referred 
to the same third term, namely the same spec- 
tator. 

The phrase " analogy of proportion " is not 



Analog ousness of Being 103 

recognized by lexicographers any more than the 
other, " analogy of attribution." We might per- 
haps not inappropriately replace it by " analogy 
based on resemblance of relations." In rhetoric, 
this kind of analogy is called metaphor. For, 
according to Webster, " a metaphor is the trans- 
ference of the relation between one set of ob- 
jects to another set for the purpose of brief 
explanation, e. g. the ship plows the sea." 

As stated before, the resemblance between the 
two sets of relations, into which the so-called 
analogy of proportion can be resolved, is not 
perfect. For where the relations compared are 
identical, as, e. g. the two ratios 3 : 6 and 4 : 8, 
the common predicate (in our case y 2 ), is af- 
firmed not analogously, but univocally. 

85. Extrinsic and intrinsic analogy of pro- 
portion. Like analogy of attribution, the anal- 
ogy resting on resemblance of relations is either 
extrinsic or intrinsic, and that for the same rea- 
son as in the previous case. 

It is extrinsic when what is expressed by the 
analogous term (e. g. lion) is intrinsic to one 
of the analogues "only, namely the principal, 
the others, the secondary, merely bearing some 
sort of resemblance to the principal. It is in- 
trinsic when the essence signified by the analo- 
gous term is found in all the analogues truly 
and properly, although the manner in which it 
is referred to each of them is not the same. 



104 Being 

As an example of this kind of analogy, we 
might take the term " accident," as applied to 
quality and quantity. Both are truly and really 
accidents, because they both inhere in substance ; 
and hence what is designated by the word " ac- 
cident " is intrinsic to both quality and quan- 
tity; but the manner in which each is related 
to the same subject (substance), is held to be 
essentially different. As the relations in which 
these two accidents stand to substance can be 
expressed by a sort of geometrical proportion, 
thus, " just as quality determines substance, so 
also does quantity, though not just in the same 
way," we can easily see why this and similar 
cases are supposed to fall under the head of 
analogy of proportion. 

86. Metaphysical and physical analogy. 
There still remains the subdivision of intrinsic 
analogy into metaphysical and physical, which 
claims our attention here, as bearing directly on 
the proofs of our next thesis. 

Intrinsic analogy (whether based on causal re- 
lations or on resemblance of relations) is meta- 
physical when an essence, conceived even as 
stripped of all its differentiating marks, is partly 
the same and partly different in relation to its 
various analogues. An instance of this kind of 
analogy is " being " as applied to its four primary 
divisions. The qualifying term " metaphysical " 



Analog oiismss of Being 105 

is used because abstract essences belong to the 
metaphysical order. 

Intrinsic analogy is physical when the essence 
signified by the common name taken together 
with its distinguishing notes, is partly the same 
and partly different. Thus " living being " as 
predicated of an elm-tree and a mocking bird 
is such an essence, if it (living being) is re- 
garded as coupled with non-sensitive and sen- 
sitive respectively. In fact, if we include indi- 
viduality as one of the attributes of a predicate, 
then all common concepts are physically analo- 
gous, since individuality in created things can 
never be the same. In this sense, " man," as 
predicated of Daniel Webster and Benjamin 
Franklin is physically analogous ; for " man " in 
the one case is identified with what makes Daniel 
Webster this individual, and in the other, with 
what constitutes Benjamin Franklin that person. 
This kind of analogy is denominated as " phys- 
ical," because it regards essences, as they are in 
themselves in the physical world. 

87. Metaphysical, physical, and logical uni- 
vocation. The two classes of analogy just ex- 
plained stand in a close relationship to a three- 
fold univocalness (or univocation), namely meta- 
physical, physical, and logical; and as the proper 
understanding of the analogy of being cannot 
be rightly appreciated without some knowledge 



106 Being 

of this tripartite division, we must briefly con- 
sider it in this place. 

A metaphysical univocal concept is one which 
expresses the same essence wherever predicated ; 
however, it does so only as prescinded in thought 
from its differentiating marks, and hence in the 
metaphysical order. Thus " living organism " 
is applied in the same way to an oak-tree, to a 
pheasant concealed within its branches and to the 
huntsman bringing it down with his gun; but 
only in as far as it abstracts from whatever is 
peculiar to its three subjects of predication. 

A physical univocal concept expresses an es- 
sence which, even when taken together with all 
its differentiating essential or specific marks, is 
the same wherever applied; and this is the rea- 
son why this kind of univocalness is qualified 
as physical, that is, independent of mental ab- 
straction. However, when we say this, we, of 
course, except the individuating differences; for 
these must necessarily be prescinded to have a 
common concept. Thus, " living organism " as 
referred to Joseph, Charles, and Albert is a 
physically univocal concept. For Joseph, Charles, 
and Albert do not differ in any essential or 
specific note from one another. 

Lastly, a logical univocal concept is one pos- 
sessing imperfect logical unity, that is to say, 
one which is indeed common to many things, 
yet which is only inadequately prescinded from 



Analog ousness of Being 107 

its differentiating modes. Such a concept is 
" being " as predicated of God, creatures, sub- 
stance, and accident. It will be seen from this, 
that logical univocalness and metaphysical anal- 
ogy (No. 86) coincide. 

ARTICLE 2 

Intrinsic Metaphysical Analogy of Being 

Summary: Discussion indicated — Thesis: Analogy 
of being intrinsic and metaphysical — 
Proofs of thesis. 

88. Discussion indicated. We are now 

done with the task, tedious perhaps, but impor- 
tant, of defining the notions requisite for the 
proper understanding of the subject under con- 
sideration. In the following thesis we shall be- 
gin to unfold our views in regard to the analo- 
gousness of being. 

THESIS 8 

" Being in general," as predicated of 
God and creatures, substance and ac- 
cident, is an analogous notion: the 
analogy in the case being at once in- 
trinsic and metaphysical. 

89. First proof of thesis. As all the un- 
usual terms occurring in the thesis have been 



io8 Being 

explained in the preceding pages, we can at 
once set out with our proof. For the sake of 
simplicity we shall first speak of being as re- 
ferred to God and creatures, and then point out 
that what applies to them applies to substance 
and accident as well. 

Let us begin by showing that the analogy of 
being, if such there be at all, must be intrinsic. 
This is so plain that it hardly needs an ex- 
planation. For being is truly inherent in God 
and creatures; it is identical with them in the 
strictest sense of the word; were it not so, the 
contradictory of being, " non-being," would have 
to be predicated of them. Hence, it only re- 
mains to show that " being as such," namely, be- 
ing prescinded from all its differentiating modes, 
is partly the same and partly different, when 
attributed to God and creatures. This follows 
as a corollary from the fifth thesis, where we 
stated that it is impossible to cut off the differ- 
entiating modes fully or adequately from being; 
for the very being of God is infinite, all-per- 
fect, underived, independent, unconditioned and 
self-existent, whilst the very being of the creature 
is finite, imperfect, derived, dependent, condi- 
tioned, and produced. Hence God and creatures 
at once agree and differ in being; and therefore 
" being " is analogous in regard to them. — What 
we have said concerning God and creatures, 
holds with equal right of substance and accident. 



Analog ousness of Being 109 

For, on the one hand, being truly inheres in 
both, and on the other, as predicated of either, 
it cannot be fully separated from " existing in 
itself " and " existing in another," the respective 
modes of substance and accident. But as we 
have developed these ideas so fully before, we 
refrain from any further exposition. 

The idea conveyed in the previous argument 
is sometimes presented in another form by say- 
ing that " being " is, indeed, common to its four 
primary divisions, but that the mode, according 
to which it exists in each of them, is not the 
same, and that this is the reason why it is partly 
the same and partly different when predicated 
of God, creatures, substance, and accident. This 
way of putting the case is perfectly correct; it 
must, however, be viewed in the light of the ex- 
position just given. "Mode" must be taken in 
a very restricted sense for a qualification which 
affects and enters the very essence of the entity 
which it modifies in such wise that it cannot be 
fully prescinded from that entity. For there are 
other modifications which can be perfectly ab- 
stracted from the concepts they limit, and there- 
fore do not render them analogous. Thus, " ra- 
tional " and " irrational " modify " animal " 
without, however, altering its nature. Man and 
brute possess the same animality; in this they 
are perfectly alike in spite of the added specifi- 
cations of rationality and its opposite. To ex- 



no Being 

press it technically, the modes of being are in- 
trinsic to being, the differences (or quasi-modes) 
of animality are extrinsic to animal. 

go. The analogy of being is intrinsic and 
metaphysical: Second proof. Let us subjoin 
another argument to prove the analogousness of 
the concept " being," founded on a process of 
elimination. It runs thus: 

The abstract concept or term of being, is 
either homonymous (equivocal), analogous, or 
univocal ; if univocal, the univocation is either 
metaphysical or logical; and if analogous, the 
analogy is either extrinsic or intrinsic. These 
would seem to be all the possible suppositions 
which can affect the question. Now we can at 
once drop logical univocation ; for, as we showed 
(No. 87), it coincides with metaphysical analogy. 
Further, it will be readily granted, being is not 
a homonymous term, that is, a term which is 
one in name only, and is applied to many things 
without any agreement in meaning whatsoever, 
as, e. g. the word " light " in the following two 
sentences : " Down is light," and " It is begin- 
ning to be light." Nor is it a univocal concept; 
because in that case, being, as abstracted from 
its distinguishing modes, would be altogether 
the same both as to what it expresses and as 
to what it implies ; in other words, it would be 
predicated of all the objects ranged under its 
scope, in the same manner; but this is not so, 



Analogousness of Being in 

as we pointed out in the previous proof. Be- 
ing, then, must be analogous. But the analogy 
cannot be extrinsic, since in extrinsic analogy 
there are always two concepts (recall the various 
meanings of "healthy"), whereas the term be- 
ing stands for but one undivided concept. More- 
over, in extrinsic analogy, the reality signified 
by the common term is intrinsic to one only 
of the analogues, whilst being is intrinsic to all. 
Whence it follows that being is an analogous 
concept, and that its analogy is at once intrinsic 
and metaphysical (No. 86) ; for we have ex- 
cluded every other rival claimant which can al- 
lege any title to describing the character of being 
in relation to its four primary subjects of pred- 
ication. 

ARTICLE 3 
Analogy of Being Analogy of Attribution 

Summary: Question proposed — Thesis: Analogy of 
being analogy of attribution — An intro- 
ductory remark — Proof — A warning 
— Being and analogy of proportion — Ac- 
cident not a univocal but an analogous 
concept — Explanatory remarks — Being 
sometimes strictly univocal — A stumbling 
block removed — " Analogical " as opposed 
to " univocal " and " proper " — Being 
rightly called a logical univocal notion — 
A tangled skein unravelled — No predicate 
affirmable of God and creatures univocally 
— p Conclusion. 



H2 Being 

91. Question proposed. The further ques- 
tion now arises, is the analogy of being that of 
" attribution " or that of " proportion " or both ? 
We shall give our reply to these queries in the 
next thesis. 

THESIS 9 

The analogy of being, in reference to 
God and creatures, substance and ac- 
cident, is what is technically known 
as analogy of attribution. 

92. An introductory remark. Before en- 
tering upon our proof, we want to note that, 
just as terms and concepts are named analo- 
gous, so likewise are the objects (entities, 
realities, or essences) signified by them. Thus, 
the two objective qualities of animal organ- 
isms, viz. " possessing health " and " indicative 
of health," both of which are denoted by the 
adjective " healthy," are analogous entities. 

93. Proof of thesis. Let us now take up 
the thesis, which is really no more than a 
corollary of the preceding. We have just 
shown that the analogy of being is intrinsic, 
because being is truly inherent in all the things 
of which it is amrmed; and we know further 
that intrinsic analogy is of " attribution," when 
the analogous entity as found in one of the ana- 
logues (the secondary), is essentially inferior to 



Analog onsness of Being 113 

the same entity as realized in the other (the 
primary), the inferiority of the secondary being 
due to its entire dependence on the principal. 
Now this is just what happens in regard to 
being as identified with God and creatures. For 
the creature cannot have any being whatsoever, 
unless God exists, because he is the ultimate 
ground not only of the existence, but also of 
the possibility of all that can be conceived out- 
side of him. And as a result of this utter de- 
pendence of creatable things on God, their " be- 
ing " is conditioned, limited, subject to change 
and capable of destruction or annihilation ; in a 
word, it is imperfect in countless ways. The. 
" being " of God, on the contrary, has attributes, 
the very opposite of the preceding: it is uncon- 
ditioned, infinite, immutable : it is the plenitude 
of all perfection. 

We can argue in a similar manner in regard 
to substance and accident. For accidents are, 
of their very nature, modifications of substance, 
incapable of existing apart from it (at least nat- 
urally), and hence, in entire dependence upon it, 
whilst substance subsists in itself and needs no 
subject in which to inhere; for it is its own 
subject. 

The analogy of being then is that which phi- 
losophers have styled " analogy of intrinsic at- 
tribution." 

94. A warning. Let us add, by way of 



114 Being 

warning, that it would be a great blunder to 
mistake the analogy of being for that of " ex- 
trinsic " attribution, as if creatures were called 
" being " solely because God has made them, 
just as the regular beat of the pulse is called 
" healthy " for this alone, that it is the effect 
of the sound condition of the body, although in 
other respects it does not bear the faintest re- 
semblance to what the proper concept of health 
suggests. For were the analogy of being of that 
sort, the universe would in no way be similar 
to its Maker, and hence tell us nothing of his 
nature; God would consequently be and ever 
remain completely hidden; and well might man- 
kind, like the Athenians in St. Paul's time, 
erect an altar and dedicate it " to the unknown 
God." 

95. Being and analogy of proportion. It 
might be further asked in this connection whether 
the concept of being also partakes of the char- 
acter of the analogy, which goes under the name 
of " analogy of proportion." Putting aside all 
mere fanciful conceptions and idle subtleties in 
this matter, we would say, no. For, in the first 
place, there can be no question of analogy of 
extrinsic proportion, because in this the essence 
expressed by the common term is not intrinsic 
to all the analogues, whilst being is thus intrin- 
sic. Nor can the analogy under consideration 
be that of intrinsic proportion, since this supposes 



Analog ousness of Being 115 

that the various analogues of which the common 
term is predicated, whilst independent of each 
other, yet stand in different relations to some 
third reality, as, for instance, the accidents 
quality and relation do to substance. Such, 
however, does not happen in the case of being 
as affirmed of its four main divisions. For, 
God and creatures are not related to any com- 
mon third object; since God, who is altogether 
independent, is related to nothing, whilst crea- 
tures are immediately referred to God. 

What we have said just now can be readily 
adapted to substance and accident, " mutatis mu- 
tandis." 

96. Accident not a univocal, but an anal- 
ogous concept. Let us next make a few re- 
marks about a question sometimes mooted and 
very closely connected with our previous dis- 
cussions, namely whether " accident " is a uni- 
vocal or an analogous term. 

Our answer is, that, like being, it is an analo- 
gous term. For the nine categories of accidents 
(viz. relation, quantity, quality, action, passion, 
place, time, position, and possession or manner 
of holding), whilst agreeing in this, that they 
are all modifications of substance, differ essen- 
tially in the manner in which they are referred 
to it ; and for this reason, accident as predicated 
of the above nine genera is partly the same and 
partly different, that is, analogous. To prove 



n6 Being 

this, we would have to show, just as in the case 
of being, that accident is determined, or restricted 
in its applicability by " logical composition." 
This point once demonstrated, we could then 
infer by way of corollary that it is predicated 
of the aforenamed nine categories in an analog- 
ical sense. The method of procedure is very 
similar to the one by which we endeavored to 
establish the analogy of being. On this account, 
and also because this matter is of lesser impor- 
tance and passed over in silence by very many 
writers on metaphysics, we do not intend to 
enter more fully into it. We shall content our- 
selves with illustrating our view by a concrete 
example. Thus, " relation " is an accident, and 
so is " quality." Both modify substance ; but 
quality (e. g. science) perfects it exclusively 
within; relation (e. g. similarity), on the other 
hand, so modifies substance as to lead our 
thoughts to something beyond, and apart from 
it. This shows that the manner in which quality 
and relation determine the same subject is dif- 
ferent ; consequently both are named " accident " 
only analogically. 

The analogy, in this case, however, is not 
analogy of attribution, but of proportion. For 
the various classes of accidents are all coor- 
dinated; none takes precedence of the rest; they 
are subordinated to substance alone. Now since 
this dependence of accidents on their substance 



Analog onsness of Being 117 

can be expressed by a sort of mathematical pro- 
portion (as exemplified before, No. 85), hence it 
is that the analogy here is analogy of proportion. 

97. Explanatory remark. Before bringing 
our exposition of analogy to a close, let us add 
a few explanatory remarks, which will help us 
to gain a more thorough mastery of this subject. 

98. Being sometimes strictly univccal. In 
our previous discussions, we spoke chiefly of 
being as related to God, creatures, substance, 
and accident. It might be asked what sort of 
a concept being is, when applied to the genera, 
species, and individuals contained within the 
scope of one and the same category. What kind 
of a concept is being, e. g. when predicated of 
plants, animals, men, this man Joseph, and the 
like? Our answer is that then it is a univocal 
concept. For being, in that case, is opposed to 
nothingness in the same way; the being predi- 
cated of plant, animal, man, Joseph, is of the 
same sort, namely created substantial being. 
Since being then is predicated after the same 
manner of all finite substances, it is a true genus, 
and hence a univocal concept in regard to them. 
Thus, if I say, " an Indian is a being " and " his 
horse is a being," " being," in each instance, 
means altogether the same, namely " something 
finite, existing in itself." 

99. A stumbling block removed. There 
are, it is true, a few stumbling blocks in the 



ii 8 Being 

path of the sincere inquirer into the analogous- 
ness of being; they are not, however, such as 
cannot be removed with a little thought, patience, 
and good will. Thus, it is urged that accord- 
ing to our doctrine, God would not be the high- 
est being, since there is something above and 
prior to him, namely " indefinite being " ; for 
God is contained under it. In answer to this 
we reply that " being," thus taken in its great- 
est generality, is prior to God in the order of 
cognition, in so far as God is not that which 
we know first; what first presents itself to our 
intellects is the creature; the consideration of 
this enables us to form the concept of being in 
general and of some other notions, such as cause 
and effect, and then by a simple process of 
reasoning to rise to the knowledge of the 
Creator, the Being of beings. Again, being is 
prior to God in the purely logical order, be- 
cause God is contained under the extension of 
the transcendental notion " being." But if we 
speak of being as it is independently of thought, 
then the being first in excellence, which is above 
all and to which none is prior, is God. 

ioo. " Analogical " as opposed to both 
" univocal " and " proper." To clear up this 
particular point a little more, let us call atten- 
tion to a double use of the word " analogical." 
Sometimes it is opposed to " univocal " — and 
this is the signification in which we have taken 



Analog ousness of Being 119 

it all along — and sometimes to " proper." 
What then is the meaning of an " analogical " 
concept as contrasted with a " proper " ? To 
understand this, let us give the definition of both. 

The proper concept presents an object to the 
mind by means of the very nature constituting 
that object, whilst the analogical concept presents 
an object, not by means of the nature of that 
object, but by means of the nature of something 
else, known by a proper concept and resembling 
the object presented. 

To illustrate the definitions just given; Sup- 
pose a man born blind and another possessing 
the power of seeing should both make the state- 
ment, " Swans are white," it is clear that the 
one only who is blessed with eyesight has a 
proper concept of " white " ; for he knows the 
nature of " whiteness " by conceiving what 
properly constitutes that quality. But the blind 
man can have but an improper or analogical 
concept of " whiteness." He can form an idea 
of that color, only because the sensation of 
" whiteness " is somewhat like the other sensa- 
tions (e. g. those "experienced through the senses 
of hearing and smell), of which he has proper 
and direct perceptions. 

In a similar manner, we derive the concept 
of Infinite Wisdom from finite wisdom, which 
we conceive by a proper concept and which 
bears some faint resemblance to the former. — 



120 Being 

This much will suffice for our purpose; a fuller 
development of the formation of analogical con- 
cepts belongs to Natural Theology. 

According to this acceptation of the word 
" analogical," being as predicated of finite things 
is a proper concept, and as affirmed of God, an 
analogical one; (for I know God by means of 
the concept "being" as derived from creatures). 
— This will help us to appreciate the statement 
sometimes heard that what the notion of being 
signifies first, is created being, but that the 
reality signified by the notion of being is found 
first and foremost in uncreated Being. 

10 1. Being as related to God, creatures, 
substance, and accident, a logical univocal 
notion. Let us now pass to another point. 
There are certain philosophers, principally the 
Scotists, who call being as related to God, 
creatures, substance, and accident univocal, but 
want it understood that the univocation in 
question is merely logical. — We fully agree 
with their view; for logical (not metaphysical) 
univocation consists in nothing else but this, 
that the concept of being, inadequately con- 
ceived is one in itself; and this kind of unity 
we claim for being, too. What we deny is, that 
being is metaphysically univocal, in other words, 
that being fully conceived remains one. The 
divergence of opinion is purely verbal, and all 
disputes concerning this phase of the subject 



Analog ousness of Being 121 

have been, to a great extent at least, mere 
logomachies, mere wars of words. 

102. A tangled skein unravelled. There 
still remains one more tangled skein to unravel. 
We asserted more than once, that the being in 
creatures is of an entirely different order from 
that in God, because the former depends on the 
latter. But it is hard to see why this reason 
should hold. For is not, for instance, the being 
and the existence of the son dependent on the 
father, and yet neither being nor human nature 
are on that account different in father and son. 
Father and son are being and man univocally. 
Why then should created being be essentially 
diverse from self-existent being, because, . for- 
sooth, the one depends on the other? Here is 
our reply. We readily admit that " being " and 
" man " are predicated of father and son in alto- 
gether the same meaning ; we also grant that the 
son depends on the father; but we maintain that 
there is an essential difference between the de- 
pendence of the son on the father, and that of 
the creature on God, which justifies us in as- 
serting the radical diversity of being as found 
in God and creatures. The son is merely in- 
debted to the father for his existence; once he 
has been brought into being, the processes of his 
development go on within him in virtue of his 
own vital energy independently of his parents. 
The case as regards God is of quite another 



122 Being 

description. For all finite things not only have 
their existence from the creative act of God but 
are also kept from annihilation by the continual 
inflow of his Almighty power; they, moreover, 
owe it to him that they are conceivable, that 
they are possible, that they are being at all (as 
is fully explained in the treatise on " Possible 
Being"). And it is on account of this entire 
dependence of creatures in their very being on 
God, that their being is essentially inferior to 
that of their Creator, whereas the dependence 
of an effect on a finite cause does not neces- 
sarily imply an essential difference of the two 
in their very nature. 

103. No predicate affirmable of God and 
creatures uni vocally. Since then the being of 
God is essentially different from that of the 
creature, it follows that no attributes whatso- 
ever can be affirmed of the Infinite and the finite 
univocally; for all attributes are identical with 
being and thus share all its characteristics. 
Hence when I say, " God is wise, good, just, 
and merciful," and " every perfect man is wise, 
good, just, and merciful," the predicates are all 
applied analogically. This is the reason why it 
is more correct to say, that God is Wisdom 
rather than that he is wise, in order thus to 
distinguish his perfections from those of his 
handiworks. 

104. Conclusion. We have thus arrived at 



Analog ousness of Being 123 

the end of our long, toilsome journey through 
the far-stretching plain of being. The labor 
expended in traversing it has not been, we hope, 
misspent; for as being is the most fundamental 
and universal notion of all, it is clear that any 
error in regard to it could not but have most 
disastrous consequences; what St. Thomas says 
(S. th. 1. q. 85. a. 2), applies here, namely, 
" Parvus error in principio magnus est in fine." 



ALPHABETICAL INDEX 

(the numbers refer to the pages.) 

Accident, not a uni vocal, but an analogous concept, 115. 

Analogical as opposed to proper, 118. 

Analogues, 96. 

Analogy of being, 90; analogy of attribution, 97; ex- 
trinsic and intrinsic analogy of attribution, 98 ; 
analogy of proportion, 101 ; extrinsic and intrinsic 
analogy of proportion, 103; analogy of being in- 
trinsic and metaphysical, 107; analogy of being 
analogy of attribution, 112; but not of proportion, 
114. 

Being and "ens" compared, 3; chimerical being, 8; be- 
ing employed as a participle and as a participial 
adjective, 5; being wholly indefinite described, 9; 
nothing, the opposite of being, 10; unity of being 
not real, 24; inclusion of the modes in being, 49; 
being not a genus, 54; composition of being with 
its modes, 60; not metaphysical, 60; but logical, 
76; unity of being imperfect, 84; analogousness 
of being, 90; analogy of being intrinsic and meta- 
physical, 107; analogy of being analogy of attri- 
bution, but not of proportion, 114; being sometimes 
strictly univocal, 117; being as related to God, crea- 
tures, substance, and accident a logical univocal no- 
tion, 120. 

Chimerical being, 8. 

125 



126 Alphabetical Index 

Comprehension of ideas, 13. 

Concept, how restricted, 61 ; univocal concepts, 94 ; 
equivocal concepts, 94; analogous concepts, 94. 

Differentia, meaning of, 54. 

Distinction in general, 30 ; distinction real and con- 
ceptual, 31 ; conceptual distinction purely mental, 
31 ; conceptual distinction not purely mental, 33 ; 
foundation of conceptual distinction not purely 
mental, 33. 

Ens and being compared, 3 ; " ens " as a noun and as a 

participle, 7. 
Equivocal terms, 92; equivocal concepts, 94. 
Extension of ideas, 13. 
Genus, meaning of, 54. 
Grades, metaphysical, 62. 

Metaphysical order, 49; metaphysical grades, 62. 
Metaphysics, province of, 1. 

Mode, meaning of, 38; number of modes, 39; inclusion 
of modes of being in being, 49. 

Nothing, the opposite of being, 10. 

Prescision in metaphysics, 27; subjective prescision, 
28; prescision in relation to purely mental distinc- 
tion, 36. 

Proper, analogical as opposed to proper, 118. 

Species, meaning of, 54. 

Term, univocal, 92; equivocal, 92; analogous, 94. 

Unity of the concept of being, 17 ; commonness and 
unity (oneness) of being, 17; unity of being not 
real, 24; general notion of unity, 24; division of 



Alphabetical Index 127 

unity, 25 ; real unity, 25 ; individual unity, 26 ; es- 
sential unity, 26 ; logical unity, 27 ; manner of ob- 
taining concepts possessing logical unity, 27; unity 
of being imperfect, 84. 

Univocal terms, 92 ; univocal concepts, 94 ; being 
sometimes strictly univocal, 117; being as related to 
God, creatures, substance, and accident a logical 
univocal notion, 120; no predicate affirmed of God 
and creatures univocally, 122. 

Univocation, metaphysical, physical and logical, 105. 



rOV 8 1911 



One copy del. to Cat. Div. 



NOV 9 <*" 



